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Abstract 
Many economic, political and social environments can be described as contests in which agents 
exert costly efforts while competing over the distribution of a scarce resource. These 
environments have been studied using Tullock contests, all-pay auctions and rank-order 
tournaments. This survey provides a comprehensive review of experimental research on these 
three canonical contests. First, we review studies investigating the basic structure of contests, 
including the number of players and prizes, spillovers and externalities, heterogeneity, risk and 
incomplete information. Second, we discuss dynamic contests and multi-battle contests. Then we 
review studies examining sabotage, feedback, bias, collusion, alliances, group contests and 
gender, as well as field experiments. Finally, we discuss applications of contests and suggest 
directions for future research. 
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1. Introduction 
Many economic, political and social environments can be described as contests in which 
competing agents have the opportunity to expend scarce resources – such as effort, money, time, 
or troops – in order to affect the probabilities of winning prizes. Examples range from the 
competition for mates, college admission, patents, or promotions within firms, to the process of 
litigation or lobbying politicians, to elections, sports competitions, and violent global conflicts 
(Tullock, 1967; Krueger, 1974). As is obvious from this list, these environments have attracted 
considerable attention in applications in a wide range of fields, both in- and out-side of 
economics. They have also been studied extensively by economic theorists in what has become 
known as the field of contest theory (Konrad, 2009). Although this field continues to attract 
many young theorists, it has its roots in three models developed in the mid-seventies to early 
eighties: the Tullock (1980) model of rent-seeking, the Lazear and Rosen (1981) rank-order 
tournament model, and the all-pay auction (Hirshleifer and Riley, 1978; Nalebuff and Stiglitz, 
1983; Dasgupta, 1986; Hillman and Riley, 1989). Despite the fact that the three models 
historically developed somewhat independently, they represent special cases of a general contest 
model that can be formulated in a unified framework. 
Despite an extensive and established theoretical literature, much less effort has been 
devoted to empirically investigate individual behavior in different contests and compare such 
behavior with theoretical predictions. The main reason is that it is not trivial to measure 
individual effort in the field since the researcher can only observe the performance of 
contestants, which is a function of effort, ability and luck (Ericsson and Charness, 1994). The 
majority of empirical studies use either firm level data (Prendergast, 1999) or sports data 
(Szymanski, 2003). Because it is typically difficult to measure the actual effort expended by 
players in the field, almost all of these studies focus solely on investigating whether the pattern 
of outcomes is consistent with the theoretical predictions. 
Controlled experiments allow researchers to test contest theory without confounding 
effects and endogeneity issues. Some experiments allow direct measurement of individual effort, 
while controlling for the relative abilities of contestants and the amount of noise (luck) in the 
tournament. The first studies to test contest theory using laboratory methods were conducted by 
Bull et al. (1987) and Millner and Pratt (1989). These studies have inspired a substantial and 
rapidly developing experimental literature on contests. The purpose of this paper is to survey this 
work. We begin by identifying the three canonical contest models and their common 
applications. 
The assumptions underlying the three contest models lead to vastly different equilibrium 
behaviors. Tullock (or lottery) contests and rank-order tournaments usually have pure strategy 
equilibria for the specifications applied, whereas all-pay auctions have only non-degenerate 
mixed strategy equilibria (in the case of complete information). Moreover, the models have 
traditionally been applied to different areas of economic analysis. The term Tullock or lottery 
contest has been commonly used in the study of R&D races and political or rent-seeking 
competitions. Rank-order tournaments (or sometimes tournaments) have been used in the 
principal-agent, contract design and labor literatures. Therefore, resources exerted in the process 
of competing in these contests are usually called efforts or expenditures. All-pay auctions have 
been used in the auction literature and in lobbying and military applications. Resources exerted 
competing in all-pay auctions are usually called bids or expenditures.  
In any given application, contest expenditures may be viewed as a good or bad from the 
standpoint of the contest designer. For instance, when modeling political or rent-seeking 
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competition, contest expenditure is often viewed as social waste, in the sense that a welfare 
maximizing social-planner would seek to minimize it (Tullock, 1980). In contrast, in 
management applications where rank-order tournaments have often been applied, effort is 
viewed as valuable because it contributes to the firm’s output. Similarly, for patent races a social 
planner may desire the positive externalities generated from increases in R&D spending. Finally, 
in many all-pay auction applications expenditure is viewed as desirable, such as the case of 
charitable fundraising or a seller of an object engaging in an all-pay auction to maximize 
revenue. Consequently, in some applications of contests the designer may be interested in 
maximizing expenditure and in some cases minimizing expenditure. Although applications of the 
three canonical models are usually different, all three models assume that (i) players exert costly 
irreversible efforts while competing for a prize and (ii) an individual player’s probability of 
winning the prize depends on the players’ relative expenditures. Obviously, the exact probability 
of winning the prize is defined differently for the three contests and is determined by a contest 
success function that maps the vector of player expenditures to the probability of winning. In the 
all-pay auction, the player exerting the highest effort wins the prize with certainty. In the rank-
order tournament, the player with the highest performance, which is the sum of effort and a 
random component, wins the prize with certainty. Finally, in the Tullock contest, the probability 
of winning equals the ratio of a player’s effort to a fixed power r ≥ 0 to the sum of each of the 
other players’ efforts, each raised to the same power r. The special case where r = 1 is the case of 
the lottery contest. 
We survey 231 experimental papers on contests; for a complete list of references see the 
working version of this paper (Dechenaux et al., 2012).
1
 The majority of these papers are already 
published or in press (159 papers), while other papers are still cited as working papers (72 
papers). More than 90% of the working papers have been written within the last five years. 
Figure 1 displays the time trend of papers published in academic journals. The figure indicates a 
dramatic increase in the number of published papers over the last decade, with more than 50% of 
the papers published in the last five years. The vast majority of published experimental studies 
are conducted in the lab (87%) employing chosen-effort experiments (75%). Some experimental 
studies are conducted in the field (13%), with more than 70% of the field studies published 
within the last five years. Out of 158 published papers, 35% of the papers are based on lottery 
contests, 25% are based on all-pay auctions, 25% on rank-order tournaments and about 15% of 
the studies examine other contest structures (usually using binary decisions or real-effort tasks). 
We begin by introducing the three canonical contest models in Section 2. There are four 
important lessons that we learn from studies discussed in Section 2: (1) most studies on lottery 
contests and all-pay auctions find significant overbidding relative to the Nash equilibrium 
prediction; (2) in contrast to lottery contests and all-pay auctions, there is little overbidding in 
rank-order tournaments and aggregate effort usually conforms to the theoretical predictions; (3) 
in all three canonical contests there is significant heterogeneity in the behavior of individual 
subjects; (4) in lottery contests and rank-order tournaments bids are usually distributed around 
the equilibrium, while in all-pay auctions the distribution of bids is bimodal, with some subjects 
submitting very low and others submitting very high bids. 
                                                 
1
 Our survey is comprehensive, so we tried to include all of the available experimental papers on contests which 
were available in 2012. We used Google Scholar, RePEc, and SSRN to locate most of the published as well as 
working papers. Then, we sent an e-mail to the ESA Google Group requesting additional working papers that we 
could not locate in our original search. 
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In Section 3 we present experimental studies investigating the basic structure of contests, 
including the number of players and prizes, spillovers and externalities, heterogeneity, risk and 
incomplete information. The main lesson that we learn from the experiments discussed in 
Section 3 is that most studies find support for the comparative statics predictions of contest 
theory. Some commonly supported comparative statics results are the impact of incomplete 
information on individual behavior, the “discouragement effect”, and the impact of contest 
parameters (e.g., the number of players and the number of prizes) on effort. 
Then we identify some common areas of focus within the literature and present a general 
review of relevant studies. For example, Section 4 reviews contests with a dynamic structure, 
such as sequential move contests, wars of attrition, multi-stage contests, patent races, best-of-n 
contests, multi-stage elimination contests, and contests with endogenous entry. Section 5 reviews 
experimental studies on games of multiple contests with linkages, such as Colonel Blotto games 
and multi-battle contests. Section 6 presents natural extensions of the experimental analysis of 
contests, such as sabotage, feedback, bias, collusion, alliances, group contests, and gender 
effects. Section 7 reviews field experiments on contests. Section 8 discusses a number of 
applications of contests, including litigation, political campaigning, lobbying, wars, sales, and 
charity giving. 
Finally, Section 9 suggests several directions for future research, including an 
examination of (1) the sources of overbidding in lottery contests and all-pay auctions, (2) the 
reasons for little (or no) overbidding in rank-order tournaments, (3) potential overbridging in 
field settings with real-effort and high stakes, and (4) potential mechanisms of de-escalation, 
deterrence, management and resolution of conflicts. 
 
2. Three Canonical Contest Models 
A contest is a game in which players are able to expend scarce resources (such as money, 
time or effort) in order to affect the probabilities of winning prizes, the values of which are 
ranked identically by the players (but may not be identical in absolute terms). The distinguishing 
characteristic of a contest is the fact that a higher expenditure of the scarce resource(s) has a 
nonnegative (and sometimes strictly positive) effect on the probability of winning the more 
valuable prizes. 
There is a wide variety of possible contests that meet the above conditions, but our focus 
throughout this survey will be, respectively, on (i) the Tullock contest, (ii) the all-pay auction 
and (iii) the rank-order tournament. In this section, we provide a simple theoretical overview of 
all three models in the context of a one-shot simultaneous-move contest of complete information 
between homogeneous players. 
Assume there are 𝑛 risk-neutral players competing for a single prize with common 
value 𝑣. Each player 𝑖 expends an effort 𝑒𝑖 and bears a cost of effort 𝑐(𝑒𝑖). The performance or 
output of player 𝑖, 𝑦𝑖, depends on player 𝑖’s effort 𝑒𝑖 and a random variable 𝜀𝑖, independently 
drawn from some common distribution with cumulative distribution function 𝐹: 
 
𝑦𝑖(𝑒𝑖, 𝜀𝑖) = 𝑒𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖.         (1) 
 
The additive random component 𝜀𝑖, can be thought of as unobservable luck or performance error. 
It can also be interpreted as an unknown ability 𝜀𝑖 (Rosen, 1986). 
Player 𝑖’s probability of winning the contest as a function of the observable 𝑛-tuple of 
outputs 𝑦 = (𝑦1, 𝑦2, … , 𝑦𝑛) ≥ 0 is given by 
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?̂?𝑖(𝑦𝑖, 𝑦−𝑖) =
𝑦𝑖
𝑟
∑ 𝑦𝑗
𝑟𝑛
𝑗=1
,         (2) 
 
if ∑ 𝑦𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1 > 0 and ?̂?𝑖(𝑦𝑖, 𝑦−𝑖) =
1
𝑛
 otherwise, where 𝑟 ≥ 0 is a parameter that measures the 
sensitivity of the probability of winning to the ratio of individual player outputs. In practice, for 
the appropriate measure of the outputs, ?̂?𝑖(𝑦𝑖, 𝑦−𝑖) may be estimated because it is based purely 
on the observable player outputs, rather than the potentially unobservable allocations of the 
scarce resource. The random mapping that compounds (1) and (2) to take a vector of player 
efforts 𝑒 = (𝑒1, 𝑒2, … , 𝑒𝑛) and obtain the probability that each player 𝑖 wins the contest is called 
the contest success function (CSF): 𝑝𝑖(𝑒𝑖, 𝑒−𝑖).  
 The outcome-contingent payoff of player 𝑖 in the contest is 
 
𝜋𝑖 = {
𝑣 − 𝑐(𝑒𝑖)         if 𝑖 wins 
𝑣/𝑛 − 𝑐(𝑒𝑖)    if 𝑖 ties   
−𝑐(𝑒𝑖)            if 𝑖 loses
.       (3) 
 
Given the performance function (1), the CSF induced by (1) and (2), and the outcome-
contingent payoff function (3), the expected payoff for player 𝑖 can be written as: 
 
𝐸(𝜋𝑖) = 𝑝𝑖(𝑒𝑖 , 𝑒−𝑖)𝑣 − 𝑐(𝑒𝑖).       (4) 
 
A simple version of a Tullock contest can be obtained by setting 𝑦𝑖 = 𝑒𝑖 in (1), 𝑟 ≥ 0 in 
(2), and 𝑐(𝑒𝑖) = 𝑒𝑖 in (3). One may interpret such a contest as a case in which there is no noise in 
the performance function (1), so 𝜀𝑖 = 0, but where the CSF coincides with (2), so that the 
probability of winning the prize equals the ratio of individual effort to aggregate effort and 
individual output to aggregate output. When 𝑟 is relatively small (a sufficiently noisy CSF) and 
there are no externalities of effort, the Nash equilibrium in a simple Tullock contest is in pure 
strategies and it is unique. The case where 𝑟 = 1 is referred to as the lottery contest. The 
equilibrium is not in pure strategies when 𝑟 is relatively large (Baye et al., 1994), and it is not 
unique when there are externalities of effort (Chowdhury and Sheremeta, 2011b). In the 
remainder of the paper we refer to contests where 0 ≤ 𝑟 < ∞ and 𝑦𝑖 = 𝑒𝑖 as Tullock contests. 
To obtain a simple version of the all-pay auction, we set 𝑦𝑖 = 𝑒𝑖 in (1), 𝑟 = ∞ in (2), and 
𝑐(𝑒𝑖) = 𝑒𝑖 in (3). The crucial difference when compared to the Tullock contest is that, except in 
the event of ties, the outcome is deterministic; the player with higher effort wins the contest with 
certainty. There is no pure strategy equilibrium in the all-pay auction. Only non-degenerate 
mixed strategy Nash equilibria exist in which players choose efforts randomly over the interval 
[0, 𝑣] (Hillman and Riley, 1989; Baye et al., 1996). 
Finally, to obtain a simple rank-order tournament we set 𝑦𝑖 = 𝑒𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 in (1), 𝑟 = ∞ in 
(2), and 𝑐(𝑒𝑖) = 𝑐(𝑒) in (3), where 𝑐𝑒 > 0 and 𝑐𝑒𝑒 > 0. The crucial difference between the rank-
order tournament and the Tullock contest and the all-pay auction is that in the former there is a 
noise component 𝜀𝑖 in the performance function (3), i.e., 𝑦𝑖 = 𝑒𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖. As in Tullock (1980), the 
rank-order tournament is often formulated in a way that generates a unique pure strategy Nash 
equilibrium. This occurs if there is a sufficient combination of noise and convexity of cost 
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(Lazear and Rosen, 1981). In the rest of the paper we will refer to contests where 𝑟 = ∞ and 
𝑦𝑖 = 𝑒𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 as Lazear-Rosen or rank-order tournaments. 
 
2.1. Tullock or Lottery Contests 
The first attempt to examine a lottery contest using laboratory methods dates back to 
Millner and Pratt (1989). Their experiment was based on the original Tullock (1980) model with 
r = 1 and r = 3. Subjects were placed in groups of two and the composition of the groups 
changed from period to period. However, instead of using a design in which the subjects make 
simultaneous single decisions, the subjects were allowed to adjust their decisions during a 
continuous time interval. For the benchmark lottery case of r = 1 the two main findings of 
Millner and Pratt (1989) are that (i) the average dissipation rate (measured as the total effort 
divided by the prize value) in the lottery contest is significantly higher than the risk-neutral 
equilibrium prediction and (ii) there is a large variation in individual effort levels. 
Since Millner and Pratt (1989), many other experiments on lottery contests (e.g., Davis 
and Reilly, 1998; Potters et al., 1998; Anderson and Stafford, 2003; Sheremeta, 2010a, 2010b, 
2011a; Sheremeta and Zhang, 2010; Savikhin and Sheremeta, 2012; Morgan et al., 2012) have 
replicated (i) overbidding (which we also refer to as over-expenditure of effort) and (ii) 
heterogeneous behavior of ex-ante symmetric contestants. Figure 2 displays a distribution of 
effort commonly observed in lottery contests. The data are taken from Sheremeta (2011a), where 
𝑛 = 2 players compete for a prize of 𝑣 = 60 in a lottery contest (i.e., 𝑟 = 1, 𝑦𝑖 = 𝑒𝑖, and 𝑐(𝑒𝑖) =
𝑒𝑖). According to the theoretical prediction, the Nash equilibrium effort is 𝑒
∗ = 𝑣(𝑛 − 1)/𝑛2 = 
15. Nevertheless, average efforts are significantly higher than predicted and the variance is 
substantial. 
There are different explanations that have been proposed in the literature for overbidding 
(Sheremeta, 2013, 2015). The first is that, in addition to monetary incentives, subjects derive a 
non-monetary utility from winning (Schmitt et al., 2004; Parco et al., 2005; Sheremeta, 2010a, 
2010b; Price and Sheremeta, 2011, 2014; Brookins and Ryvkin, 2014; Mago et al., 2014). 
Sheremeta (2010b) illustrates subjects’ non-monetary utility of winning in an example of a 
simple lottery contest with a prize value of zero (i.e., 𝑣 = 0). Interestingly, about 40% of the 
subjects exert positive costly effort in contests for a prize of 𝑣 = 0 and these efforts are correlated 
with efforts in contests for a strictly positive prize of 𝑣 = 120. Figure 3 displays the correlation 
between effort for a prize of 𝑣 = 0 and effort for a prize of 𝑣 = 120. The data are taken from 
Sheremeta (2010b), where 𝑛 = 4 players compete in a lottery contest. According to the 
theoretical prediction, when 𝑣 = 120, the Nash equilibrium effort is 𝑒∗ = 𝑣(𝑛 − 1)/𝑛2 = 22.5. 
Figure 3 shows that subjects who exert higher efforts for the prize of zero also exert higher 
efforts for the positive monetary prize of 120 (correlation coefficient of 0.38).
2
 
The second reason for overbidding is that, in addition to the utility from winning, subjects 
care about their relative payoffs (Herrmann and Orzen, 2008; Mago et al., 2014). Using a 
modified utility function, Mago et al. (2014) prove theoretically that status-seeking subjects who 
strive to maximize their relative payoffs should exert higher efforts in equilibrium. In their 
experiment, Mago et al. (2014) find that 51% of subjects indicate positive utility from winning 
                                                 
2
 Whether this correlation comes from non-pecuniary benefits from winning or other sources demands further 
research. For instance, it may be the case that subjects who make errors in assessing their bidding strategies for a 
prize of value zero also are likely to make errors in bidding for higher value prizes. At the same time, it may well be 
the case that the non-pecuniary benefits from winning are not invariant to the monetary value of the prize. 
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and 67% of subjects behave as status-seekers, suggesting that overbidding in contests can be 
explained by a combination of a utility from winning and relative payoff maximization. 
The third explanation is based on the fact that subjects are prone to mistakes. These 
mistakes add noise to the Nash equilibrium solution, and thus may cause overbidding in contests. 
Several studies have provided support for this argument by analyzing the quantal response 
equilibrium model (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995), which accounts for errors made by subjects, 
and testing the predictions of this model in lottery contests (Sheremeta, 2011a; Chowdhury et al., 
2014; Lim et al., 2014). 
A fourth explanation suggests that overbidding in contests can also be explained by the 
fact that subjects exhibit certain judgmental biases, such as non-linear probability weighting and 
the hot hand fallacy, which prevent them from exerting rational effort levels in contests (Parco et 
al., 2005; Amaldoss and Rapoport, 2009; Sheremeta and Zhang, 2010). 
Finally, several recent studies suggested that a significant amount of non-equilibrium 
behavior in contests can be explained by features of the experimental design (Fallucchi et al., 
2013; Chowdhury et al., 2014; Masiliunas et al., 2014). For example, in a two-by-two design, 
Chowdhury et al. (2014) vary whether the prize is assigned probabilistically (i.e., efforts 
determine the probabilities of winning the prize) or proportionally (i.e., efforts determine the 
shares of the prize) and whether the cost function is linear or convex, while holding the Nash 
equilibrium effort level constant. They find that compared to the probabilistic CSF, the 
proportional rule results in average effort closer to the Nash prediction. Combining the share rule 
with a convex cost function further enhances this result.  
Heterogeneous behavior of ex-ante symmetric contestants is usually attributed to 
demographic differences, heterogeneous preferences towards winning, risk, losses and inequality 
(Sheremeta, 2013, 2015). Price and Sheremeta (2014), for example, find that men and more 
religious subjects tend to exert up to 25% lower effort than women and less religious subjects. 
Sheremeta (2010a, 2010b) finds that subjects who demonstrate having higher non-monetary 
utility of winning exert higher effort in lottery contests (see Figure 3). Many studies find that 
risk-averse subjects exert lower efforts in lottery contests than risk-neutral or risk-seeking 
subjects (Millner and Pratt, 1991; Anderson and Freeborn, 2010; Sheremeta and Zhang, 2010; 
Sheremeta, 2011a; Shupp et al., 2013; Mago et al., 2013). Shupp et al. (2013) find that more 
loss-averse subjects exert lower efforts than less loss-averse subjects. Finally, Mago et al. (2014) 
find that inequality-averse subjects exert higher efforts than subjects who care only about their 
own payoffs. 
 
2.2. All-Pay Auctions 
In this section we discuss the contest known as an all-pay auction with complete 
information (Hillman and Riley, 1989; Baye et al., 1996).
3
 In such a contest the highest bidder 
wins the prize with certainty and all bidders have to pay their bids. Baye et al. (1996) 
characterize the entire set of equilibria for the all-pay auction with complete information, a 
continuous strategy space and arbitrary prize valuations. All equilibria are in mixed strategies 
and in games with three or more players, for certain configurations of the players’ valuations of 
the prize, multiple equilibria exist. One feature of Nash equilibrium is that it may be asymmetric 
even in symmetric games. 
                                                 
3
 Early treatments of special cases of all-pay auctions include Hirshleifer and Riley (1978), Nalebuff and Stiglitz 
(1983) and Dasgupta (1986). 
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As in Tullock contests, overbidding relative to the Nash equilibrium prediction in 
aggregate data emerges as an empirical regularity. Davis and Reilly (1998) were arguably the 
first to report substantial overbidding in all-pay auctions using a design that focused on 
asymmetric auctions. Their important finding carries over to symmetric all-pay auctions. Indeed, 
except for Potters et al. (1998), the majority of studies using symmetric all-pay auctions with 
complete information also find that session averages reflect overbidding (Gneezy and 
Smorodinsky, 2006; Lugovskyy et al., 2010; Fehr and Schmidt, 2011; Klose and Sheremeta, 
2012; Ernst and Thöni, 2013; Ong and Chen, 2013). While Potters et al. find evidence of 
equilibrium play in their two-player all-pay auction experiment, their design imposed an 
exogenous cap on bids (15% above the prize value), which may have biased behavior toward 
lower, equilibrium bids. In contrast, a study by Gneezy and Smorodinsky (2006) finds that the 
sum of effort levels (or “revenue”, in the language of auction theory) is much higher than 
predicted and often twice to five times higher than the common prize value. Winning bids are 
frequently within 10 percentage points of the value of the prize and sometimes exceed it. 
Moreover, Gneezy and Smorodinsky (2006) find that subjects appear to randomize over a set of 
bids as theory predicts, but they tend to place too much weight on relatively low and relatively 
high bids. Figure 4 displays a distribution of bids in one of the treatments from Gneezy and 
Smorodinsky (2006). In this treatment, there are 𝑛 = 4 players competing for a prize of 𝑣 = 100 
in an all-pay auction (i.e., 𝑟 = ∞, 𝑦𝑖 = 𝑒𝑖, and 𝑐(𝑒𝑖) = 𝑒𝑖). The picture shows clear evidence of 
bimodal behavior, with some subjects submitting very low and others submitting very high bids.
4
 
Many other all-pay auction studies generate distributions with a similar shape. Klose and 
Sheremeta (2012) and Ernst and Thöni (2013) rely on loss aversion from Kahneman and 
Tversky’s (1979) prospect theory to explain bimodal behavior. The basic assumption is that 
players evaluate outcomes relative to a reference point. If they earn more than their reference 
point, they are in the domain of gains, otherwise in the domain of losses. The utility function is 
concave in the domain of gains and convex in the domain of losses. In addition, people suffer 
more from the loss of a certain amount of money than they enjoy from the win of the same 
amount. A utility function based on these assumptions gives rise to a bimodal bidding behavior 
in the equilibrium of an all-pay auction. 
Lugovskyy et al. (2010) further explore observed deviations from Nash equilibrium in 
all-pay auctions. In long sessions, lasting 60 periods, with fixed matching of four-player groups, 
they show that learning seems to bring bids closer to the Nash equilibrium prediction in the 
aggregate. Aggregate over-dissipation also decreases in long sessions under random matching, 
but remains above the levels observed with fixed matching. In their early experimental treatment 
of an asymmetric all-pay auction, Davis and Reilly (1998) also report that experience reduces 
overbidding. 
While caution is warranted when drawing parallels between the two contest forms, it is 
natural to ask whether the pattern of overbidding in all-pay auctions arises from the same factors 
as in lottery contest experiments. For example, as in lottery contests, overbidding in all-pay 
auctions may be caused by mistakes, a non-monetary utility of winning or judgmental biases. 
However, further research is required to conclusively determine whether patterns of data in all-
pay auctions and lottery contests are caused by the same phenomenon. 
 
                                                 
4
 In the symmetric complete information all-pay auction with a continuous strategy space and n = 4, there is a 
continuum of asymmetric Nash equilibria in which one or two players place probability mass at 0. Hence, a 
significant incidence of zero bids may be consistent with behavior in asymmetric equilibria. 
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2.3. Rank-Order Tournaments 
Since the seminal paper by Lazear and Rosen (1981), rank-order tournaments have been 
extensively investigated in the lab. To the best of our knowledge the first laboratory experiment 
on rank-order tournaments is Bull et al. (1987). Bull et al. implement rank-order tournaments 
between pairs of subjects whose output is the sum of effort and a uniformly distributed 
productivity shock, i.e., 𝑦𝑖 = 𝑒𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 where 𝜀𝑖~𝑈[−𝑎, 𝑎]. In their design, a sufficiently disperse 
support of the distribution of the noise parameter 𝜀𝑖 guarantees that a unique pure strategy Nash 
equilibrium exists. The main purpose of the experiment was to test the theory and to compare the 
performance of a rank-order tournament to a simple piece-rate incentive scheme. The main 
results of Bull et al. (1987) are that the average effort levels in tournaments are well predicted by 
theory and are similar to efforts under the piece-rate scheme.
5
 However, the variance of effort is 
much greater under the tournament. 
The findings of Bull et al. (1987) have been replicated by a large number of experiments 
on rank-order tournaments (Schotter and Weigelt, 1992; Nalbantian and Schotter, 1997; 
Harbring and Irlenbusch, 2005, 2008; Orrison et al., 2004; Wu and Roe, 2005; Wu et al. 2006; 
Harbring et al., 2007; Harbring and Lünser, 2008; Eriksson et al., 2009b; Sheremeta and Wu, 
2011; Eisenkopf and Teyssier, 2012, 2013; Agranov and Tergiman, 2013). Several exceptions 
are Chen et al. (2011), who observe over-expenditure in contests with asymmetric contestants, 
and Kräkel and Nieken (2012), who observe twice as high effort levels than predicted in a 
tournament with minimum productivity requirements. Figure 5 displays the dynamics of average 
effort over the length of the experiment commonly observed in rank-order tournaments. The data 
are taken from Orrison et al. (2004) where 𝑛 = 2, 4 or 6 symmetric players compete for large 
prizes of 𝑣1 = $2.04 (1, 2 or 3 prizes, respectively) and small prizes of 𝑣2 = $0.86 (1, 2 or 3 
prizes, respectively) in a rank-order tournament (i.e., 𝑟 = ∞, 𝑦𝑖 = 𝑒𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖, 𝜀𝑖~𝑈[−𝑎, 𝑎] and 
𝑐(𝑒𝑖) = 𝑒𝑖
2/𝑏, where 𝑎 = 60 and 𝑏 = 15,000). According to the theoretical prediction, the Nash 
equilibrium effort is 𝑒∗ = (𝑣1 − 𝑣2)𝑏/4𝑎 = 73.5. As Figure 5 indicates, for every 𝑛, the average 
effort is quite close to the predicted level and there is no overbidding. 
Although on average there is little (or no) overbidding in rank-order tournaments, 
heterogeneity of individual behavior is widespread (Bull et al., 1987). The high variance of effort 
is especially problematic because in a labor-management context, where rank-order tournaments 
are often employed in the field (for a review see Charness and Kuhn, 2011), a high variance in 
individual performance can impose a substantial cost on employers and reduce the overall 
efficiency of the work place (Lazear, 1999, 2000). What might account for the high variance in 
individual effort? In their follow-up to Bull et al. (1987), Drago and Heywood (1989) argue that 
part of the variance in the Bull et al. data may simply be due to relatively flat payoff functions. 
They conduct several additional treatments and show that the variance in effort is comparable 
between a tournament and piece-rate scheme when payoff functions (as functions of vectors of 
efforts) are kept as similar as possible across the two reward schemes. Eriksson et al. (2009b) 
experimentally examine an alternative explanation for the high variance in effort in simple rank-
                                                 
5
 An important advantage of rank-order tournaments over alternative compensation schemes is that tournament 
incentives are not affected by common shocks (random noise that impacts all players equally), since common shocks 
do not change the relative ranking of players’ efforts (Wu and Roe, 2005; Wu et al., 2006; Agranov and Tergiman, 
2013). As a result of filtering common shocks, tournaments reduce agents’ risk exposure, making them more 
attractive than other compensation schemes. Wu and Roe (2005) and Wu et al. (2006) show both theoretically and 
experimentally that in the presence of common shocks tournaments outperform fixed performance contracts and 
piece-rates by eliciting higher efforts. 
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order tournaments. They find that allowing subjects to choose their payment scheme between the 
tournament and the piece-rate scheme significantly reduces the variance of effort in rank-order 
tournaments. They also find that risk-averse subjects are less likely to participate in the 
tournament, which has an additional negative effect on the variance of effort. 
In summary, there are four important lessons that we learn from experimental studies 
discussed in this section. First, most studies on lottery contests and all-pay auctions find 
significant overbidding relative to the Nash equilibrium prediction. Second, in contrast to lottery 
contests and all-pay auctions, there is very little overbidding in rank-order tournaments and 
aggregate effort usually conforms to the theoretical predictions. Third, in all three canonical 
contests there is significant heterogeneity in the behavior of individual subjects. Finally, in 
lottery contests and rank-order tournaments bids are usually distributed around the equilibrium, 
while in all-pay auctions the distribution of bids is bimodal, with some subjects submitting very 
low and others submitting very high bids. 
 
3. Contest Structure 
As discussed by Konrad (2009), even simple one-stage contests are often characterized 
by many parameters (i.e., number of players, heterogeneity of players and number of prizes) and 
they can have very different structures (i.e., incomplete information, risk aversion, spillovers and 
externalities). All of these factors play an important role in influencing the behavior of individual 
players. In this section we review the experimental literature investigating some of these factors. 
 
3.1. Number of Players 
Theoretically, it is not clear how the number of players impacts individual behavior in 
contests. For example, for the symmetric case it is generally true that when a contest is modeled 
as an all-pay auction or as a lottery contest, then the expected individual effort decreases with the 
number of players (Konrad, 2009). However, when the contest is modeled as a rank-order 
tournament, then, depending on the distribution of noise, the expected effort may decrease, 
increase, or remain unchanged when the number of players increases (Gerchak and He, 2003). 
The experimental evidence on the effect of the number of players on individual behavior 
in contests is also somewhat mixed. Sheremeta (2011a), for example, finds that the average 
effort in a symmetric two-player lottery contest is 33% of the prize value, while in the 
corresponding four-player contest the average effort is 25% of the prize. Therefore, as predicted 
by the theory, the average individual effort decreases in the number of players. Morgan et al. 
(2012) also find support for this comparative static prediction with different group sizes. On the 
other hand, Lim et al. (2014) find that the average individual effort does not respond to the 
number of players. They attribute their findings to the fact that subjects make mistakes when 
choosing an effort level. 
In all-pay auctions, Gneezy and Smorodinsky (2006) find that the average effort 
decreases in the number of players. On the other hand, Harbring and Irlenbusch (2003) document 
that the average effort weakly increases in the number of players. An explanation for these 
differences is that in Harbring and Irlenbusch (2003), subjects’ efforts are restricted by a 
maximum effort cap set, while in Gneezy and Smorodinsky (2006), subjects can choose any 
effort (even higher than the prize value). 
In rank-order tournaments, Orrison et al. (2004) find that the average effort does not 
change in the number of players when the noise component 𝜀𝑖 is uniformly distributed. List et al. 
(2014) investigate the effect of the number of players under different distributions of noise. They 
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design three treatments in which, depending on the noise distribution, a risk-neutral contestant’s 
effort should decrease, increase or remain the same. They find that, contrary to theoretical 
predictions, the average individual effort always decreases in the number of players.  
To summarize, across the three canonical contests, the evidence seems to favor a negative 
relationship between group size and individual effort. However, such an interpretation should be 
taken with caution because the relationship between group size and individual effort depends 
both on the experimental design and the underlying theoretical structure. 
 
3.2. Heterogeneous Players 
The theoretical literature on contests has recognized that greater heterogeneity between 
players (appropriately normalized depending on the contest) leads to lower aggregate effort 
(Baye et al., 1993, 1996; Gradstein, 1995; Baik, 1994; Stein, 2002). The reason for this is the so 
called “discouragement effect.” Although the technical details underlying the discouragement 
effect differ from model to model, they basically arise because a weaker player, either with 
higher unit costs of effort or a lower value of winning, finds it relatively unprofitable to try to 
beat the stronger player and, consequently, cuts back on his costly expenditure. This, in turn, 
may allow the stronger player to bid more passively as well when compared to a contest in which 
he faces a player of similar strength.  
The impact of player heterogeneity on individual behavior has been thoroughly 
investigated in lottery contests. Davis and Reilly (1998), for example, compare a four-player 
symmetric lottery contest for a given prize with a five-player lottery contest in which the added 
player has a higher value of the prize. They find that adding the high-value bidder increases the 
total expenditure, which is consistent with the comparative static prediction. However, individual 
expenditures across the two contests for the four low-value players increase, which is not 
consistent with the comparative static prediction. Anderson and Stafford (2003) use a more 
complex design with a variable number of players, cost heterogeneity and an entry fee to study 
the theoretical predictions of Gradstein (1995). They find that, consistent with the theoretical 
predictions, cost heterogeneity reduces the aggregate number of players who enter. Moreover, 
for larger groups, higher heterogeneity decreases individual and aggregate efforts. Fonseca 
(2009), Anderson and Freeborn (2010) and Kimbrough et al. (2014) experimentally study lottery 
contests with heterogeneous players, where heterogeneity arises from the contestants’ differing 
impacts on the CSF. All three studies find that, as predicted by the theory, more heterogeneity 
between players leads to lower effort in lottery contests. 
The first study investigating a complete information all-pay auction with asymmetric 
players is Davis and Reilly (1998). Consistent with theoretical predictions, Davis and Reilly find 
that, introducing a higher valuation player into a model in which players have a given common 
value reduces the individual efforts of the original symmetric players relative to their efforts in 
the symmetric game. However, as before, there is significant overbidding, both in the benchmark 
symmetric game and the asymmetric game, with a substantial portion of the overbidding in the 
latter game being driven by the behavior of the stronger players. Fehr and Schmidt (2011) 
replicate these findings in an experiment designed to investigate the “exclusion principle” of 
Baye et al. (1993). Finally, Deck and Sheremeta (2012) find support for a discouragement effect 
in dynamic all-pay auctions with asymmetric players, where theoretical benchmarks (Konrad and 
Kovenock, 2009) suggest that the discouragement effect might be even stronger than in 
simultaneous move games. 
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Asymmetries have also been investigated in rank-order tournaments (Weigelt et al., 1989; 
Schotter and Weigelt, 1992). Weigelt et al. (1989), for example, study biased rank-order 
tournaments, and find that when one player has an unfair head-start over another, both players 
exert lower effort than symmetric players. Schotter and Weigelt (1992) extend this analysis to 
the case of both “unfair” (where the rules favor one identical player over another) and “uneven” 
(where players have different costs of effort) tournaments. As before, they find that either 
asymmetry between players reduces individual efforts. 
 
3.3. Multiple Prizes 
Theoretical research has shown that the optimal prize structure in contests depends on 
many factors (for a review see Sisak, 2009). Clark and Riis (1998) and Fu and Lu (2009), for 
example, show that in a symmetric lottery contest modified to allow multiple prizes the highest 
aggregate effort is obtained by offering one grand prize. Barut and Kovenock (1998) show that in 
an n-player symmetric contest in which the m-th highest bidder receives the m-th largest prize, 
any distribution of a fixed purse across n (nonnegative) prizes yields the same expected total 
expenditure as long as the lowest value prize is zero. Moldovanu and Sela (2001) show that in 
the all-pay auction with incomplete information and private values of a multiplicative coefficient 
in the cost function (reflecting idiosyncratic ability) one grand prize elicits the highest effort 
from participants when the common component of the cost of effort function is either linear or 
concave. However, if the contestants have a convex common component of cost several prizes 
may be optimal. Moreover, across a wide range of specific contest models, multiple prizes may 
generate higher efforts when contestants are risk-averse (Krishna and Morgan, 1998; Kalra and 
Shi, 2001) or heterogeneous (Szymanski and Valletti, 2005; Moldovanu et al., 2007). 
There is a growing number of experimental studies investigating the optimality of the 
prize structure in contests (Harbring and Irlenbusch, 2003; Orrison et al., 2004; Müller and 
Schotter, 2010; Chen et al., 2011; Sheremeta, 2011a; Shupp et al., 2013; Lim et al., 2014; 
Stracke et al., 2014). These studies are based on different theoretical models (i.e., lottery 
contests, all-pay auctions and rank-order tournaments), and thus they are not directly 
comparable. Nevertheless, one aspect common to all of these studies is the assumption that the 
contest designer allocates a fixed amount of money either to one grand prize or split between 
multiple prizes. 
Sheremeta (2011a) compares the performance of single-prize and two-prize lottery 
contests with four symmetric players, where the total prize value is held constant across the 
treatments. Consistent with the theoretical predictions of Clark and Riis (1998), the single-prize 
contest generates higher effort than multiple-prize contests. Shupp et al. (2013) also find that the 
single-prize contest results in a higher aggregate effort than the multiple-prize contest, although 
their theoretical model predicts that under risk neutrality both contests are equivalent. Stracke et 
al. (2014) show that even in a multi-stage elimination lottery contest between symmetric players, 
a single-prize generates higher efforts than when multiple prizes are allocated at the end of the 
contest. 
Müller and Schotter (2010) experimentally investigate the all-pay auction model of 
Moldovanu and Sela (2001) and find that, consistent with equilibrium, in the case of a linear 
common cost component a one-prize contest generates higher efforts than a two-prize contest, 
whereas in case of a quadratic common cost component a two-prize contest generates higher 
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efforts than a one-prize contest.
6
 They also find that, although theory predicts effort levels that 
are continuous and increasing in the coefficient representing ability, observed effort is bimodal. 
Low ability players drop out and exert little or no effort, while high ability players try too hard 
and overbid. 
Orrison et al. (2004), were perhaps the first to experimentally investigate how prize 
structure impacts effort in rank-order tournaments. They found that total effort is lower in 
tournaments with many small prizes than with few large prizes.
 
However, in theory, multiple-
prize contests may generate higher efforts if, for example, contestants are heterogeneous 
(Szymanski and Valletti, 2005; Moldovanu et al., 2007). Intuitively, if there is one very strong 
player and only one prize, then the weaker players may be discouraged from exerting effort as 
per the “discouragement effect” introduced in Section 3.2. Chen et al. (2011) investigate the 
optimal number of winning prizes in rank-order tournaments with heterogeneous contestants, 
where strong players have an ex ante advantage in terms of their initial endowment over weak 
players. They find that strong players increase their effort when the number of prizes is raised 
from one to two. 
Finally, Kalra and Shi (2001) show theoretically that a multiple-prize rank-order 
tournament may generate higher total expenditure than a single-prize tournament when 
contestants are risk-averse. To test these predictions, Lim et al. (2009) investigate the optimality 
of a multiple-prize tournament in the presence of symmetric risk-averse contestants. Based on 
the model by Kalra and Shi, Lim et al. predict that multiple positive prizes, in which each prize is 
of different value, should generate higher efforts than a single prize. Consistent with the 
theoretical predictions, their experimental results indicate that increasing the number of winners 
generates higher effort under risk aversion. 
 
3.4. Endogenous Prizes, Spillovers and Externalities 
In many contests, it is appropriate to consider endogenously determined prizes that are 
functions of the profile of efforts rather than the more common assumption of an exogenous 
prize value. The endogeneity may be imposed by a designer, or may be the result of effort 
spillovers or externalities that arise naturally in the contest environment. Contests with 
endogenous prizes are especially interesting because theoretically they can generate qualitatively 
different predictions than contests with exogenous prizes (Chung, 1996; Baye and Hoppe, 2003; 
Long and Vousden, 1987; Chowdhury and Sheremeta, 2011a, 2011b, 2014; Baye et al., 2012). 
For instance, Baye et al. (2012) show that in some cases, all-pay auctions with endogenous prizes 
will have pure strategy equilibria. Recall that by contrast, all-pay auctions of complete 
information with exogenous prizes only have mixed strategy equilibria. Sacco and Schmutzler 
(2008) study an all-pay auction where endogenous prizes depend positively on own effort and 
negatively on the competitors’ effort. They find evidence that subjects often coordinate on 
asymmetric pure strategy equilibria, where one player exerts all the effort while others exert no 
effort at all.  
Cason et al. (2010) suggest that to attract more entrants into a contest it may be beneficial 
for a contest designer to use a proportional-prize structure. In the proportional-prize contest, 
there are no winners or losers as described in the payoff function (3) and determined by the 
probability specified in (2). Instead, each player 𝑖 wins with certainty a prize 𝑣𝑖(𝑒𝑖, 𝑒−𝑖) that is 
                                                 
6
 Freeman and Gelber (2010) conduct an experimental test of Moldovanu and Sela (2001) based on a real-effort 
experiment. They find that subjects’ performance is higher when multiple prizes are offered than when a single prize 
is offered. 
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endogenously determined by the vector of efforts of the contestants. This yields a payoff 
structure similar to (4), but where 𝑣𝑖(𝑒𝑖, 𝑒−𝑖) replaces 𝑝𝑖(𝑒𝑖, 𝑒−𝑖)𝑣. The simplest form of a 
proportional-prize contest is a share contest in which efforts determine the shares of a prize 𝑣 
(i.e., instead of probabilistically, the prize is assigned proportionally). Cason et al. (2013) 
compare the performance of a share contest to a single-prize contest.
7
 They find that, consistent 
with theory, single-prize contests generate higher efforts than share contests, but at the same 
time, share contests generate higher and more equitable payoffs. This specific feature of 
proportional-prize contests can explain why proportional prizes elicit higher entry rates than 
lottery contests with a single prize (Cason et al., 2010). 
Baye et al. (2005, 2012) and Chowdhury and Sheremeta (2011a, 2011b, 2014) examine 
contests in which winner and loser prizes may be asymmetrically influenced by rival effort. For 
example, in innovation contests one firm’s R&D effort may provide information spillovers that 
benefit its rival, the value of which may depend on the identity of the winner. Alternatively, in 
such a race the expenditure of a rival might decrease the patent value for the winner by hastening 
further innovation, creating a negative spillover. Another example where spillovers and 
externalities are important is litigation. Depending on the litigation system, losers have to 
compensate winners for a portion of their legal expenditures or, under one prominent proposal, 
up to the amount actually spent by the loser. 
Several experimental studies have examined contests with spillovers. For instance, 
Dechenaux and Mancini (2008) have examined a two-player contest with a generalized contest 
payoff function as in Baye et al. (2005). Specifically, instead of a payoff function (3), the payoff 
for player 𝑖 is given by 
 
𝜋𝑖(𝑒𝑖, 𝑒𝑗) = {
𝑣𝑖 − 𝛽𝑒𝑖 − (1 − 𝛼)𝑒𝑗     if 𝑖 wins 
𝑣𝑖/2 − 𝑒𝑖                           if 𝑖 ties   
−𝛼𝑒𝑖 − (1 − 𝛽)𝑒𝑗          if 𝑖 loses
.     (5) 
 
The CSF in Dechenaux and Mancini (2008) corresponds to an all-pay auction. By contrast, 
Coughlan and Plott (1997) employ a lottery CSF and a payoff function that differs slightly from 
that in equation (5). As in contests without spillovers, both studies find significant overbidding in 
comparison to the Nash benchmark.  
Cohen and Shavit (2012) study a lottery contest version of the sad loser auction (see 
Riley and Samuelson, 1981; Baye et al., 2012). In such a contest, the designer reimburses the 
winner’s cost of effort (bid), so the payoff for player 𝑖 is given by 
 
𝜋𝑖(𝑒𝑖, 𝑒𝑗) = {
𝑣𝑖      if 𝑖 wins
−𝑒𝑖    if 𝑖 loses
.        (6) 
 
Theory predicts that lottery contests with refunds should generate higher average bids than all-
pay lottery contests (Matros and Armanios, 2009). The results of the experiment provide support 
for this prediction. Theory also predicts that the revenue of a contest designer should be higher in 
the lottery contest with refunds (once the cost of the winner’s effort is refunded). This prediction 
is not supported in the experiment, mainly because low valuation players bid too low in contests 
                                                 
7
 Shared contests have also been studied by Fallucchi et al. (2013), Shupp et al. (2013), Chowdhury et al. (2014), 
and Masiliunas et al. (2014). 
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with refunds. Overall, Cohen and Shavit (2012) find evidence that subjects’ behavior is more 
consistent with a corner solution, in which low valuation players bid zero. 
 
3.5. Risk and Loss Aversion 
Most of the theoretical results in the contest literature are derived under the assumption of 
risk neutrality. However, it is well documented that the majority of individuals are risk-averse 
(Holt and Laury, 2002). Most theoretical models of contests incorporate risk aversion by 
assuming that the utility function is non-separable in the prize value 𝑣 and cost of effort 𝑐(𝑒𝑖). In 
this case, instead of the expected payoff function (4), the following expected utility function 
applies: 
 
𝐸(𝜋𝑖) = 𝑝𝑖(𝑒𝑖 , 𝑒−𝑖)𝑈(𝑣 − 𝑐(𝑒𝑖)) + (1 − 𝑝𝑖(𝑒𝑖, 𝑒−𝑖))𝑈(−𝑐(𝑒𝑖)).   (7) 
 
When examining the expected utility function (7) it is not clear how preferences impact 
individual behavior in contests. Millner and Pratt (1991) focused on symmetric two player 
contests and showed that risk aversion may not reduce total effort. They noted that, theoretically, 
the direction of the effect of risk aversion on effort depended on the third derivative of utility. If 
this was positive (a condition that has become known as “prudence”) risk aversion would reduce 
total effort. Otherwise, total effort would increase. This observation was later extended to 
symmetric n-player contests by Treich (2010) and to a class of asymmetric contests by Cornes 
and Hartley (2012). 
Millner and Pratt (1991) also carried out an experiment to assess the effect of risk 
aversion on effort. They found that more risk-averse subjects choose lower efforts than less risk-
averse subjects, but efforts are still higher than predicted. Following Millner and Pratt, many 
studies have replicated the finding that risk-averse subjects exert lower effort in lottery contests 
than risk-neutral or risk-seeking subjects (Anderson and Freeborn, 2010; Sheremeta and Zhang, 
2010; Sheremeta, 2011a; Mago et al., 2013; Shupp et al., 2013). Therefore, it appears that 
although theoretical predictions regarding risk aversion are ambiguous, the findings from 
experimental studies suggest that more risk-aversion leads to lower effort in contests. 
Related to risk-aversion, there are several experimental studies examining the impact of 
loss-aversion on individual behavior in contests. Shupp et al. (2013), for example, compare 
individuals’ decisions across three resource allocation contests which are isomorphic under risk-
neutrality. They also elicit preferences toward risk, ambiguity and losses, and find that loss 
aversion preferences are best at predicting individual behavior in contests, with more loss-averse 
subjects exerting lower efforts than less loss-averse subjects. Experimental investigations of loss-
aversion in contests also include Müller and Schotter (2010), Ernst and Thöni (2013) and Klose 
and Sheremeta (2012) for all-pay auctions and Gill and Prowse (2012) and Eisenkopf and 
Teyssier (2013) for rank-order tournaments. 
 
3.6. Incomplete Information 
A number of experiments have examined lottery contests and all-pay auctions in a private 
values environment. There is incomplete information because each bidder only knows his own 
valuation of the prize (or, alternatively, the marginal cost of effort). In most experiments, 
valuations (or costs) are drawn independently from uniform distributions. A theoretical analysis 
of lottery contests with incomplete information in a symmetric environment can be found in 
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Ryvkin (2010) and Wasser (2013) and treatments of all-pay auctions can be found in Krishna 
and Morgan (1997) and Moldovanu and Sela (2001). 
Brookins and Ryvkin (2014) compare lottery contests with complete and incomplete 
information regarding the marginal cost of effort. Each player’s marginal cost of effort is an i.i.d. 
draw from a uniform distribution. They show that with two players, whether or not information 
is complete does not affect equilibrium effort expenditure significantly. However, with four 
players, players with a low marginal cost (high marginal cost) submit lower (higher) effort bids 
under complete information than under incomplete information. These equilibrium predictions 
are borne out by the data, but not surprisingly, the authors also observe substantial overbidding. 
Barut et al. (2002) were the first to experimentally examine all-pay auctions in a 
symmetric private values environment, but the focus of their study was all-pay auctions with 
multiple units. They assumed uniformly distributed private values for a single unit. Relative to 
the symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium, underbidding at low valuations and overbidding at 
high valuations was observed, and the outcomes were not always efficient, in the sense that 
higher-valued players did not necessarily win the units. In the aggregate, there was overbidding 
so that average revenue is higher than predicted. The follow up study by Noussair and Silver 
(2006) used six-player single-prize all-pay auctions, again with uniformly distributed private 
values. They also found aggregate overbidding relative to the Bayesian Nash equilibrium, with 
average revenues far above the theoretically predicted expected revenue. As in Barut et al. 
auction outcomes were not always efficient. When considering subject level data, a prominent 
outcome in both Barut et al. and Noussair and Silver is the phenomenon Müller and Schotter 
(2010) refer to as bifurcation: low-valuation subjects underbid, while high-valuation subjects 
tend to overbid. For instance, Figure 6 is drawn from data obtained from Noussair and Silver 
(2006). The frequency of zero bids is much higher than predicted by equilibrium behavior. For 
example, in the Bayesian Nash equilibrium only subjects with a valuation of zero should bid 
zero, whereas in the experiment, the modal bid for subjects with valuations in the 25th percentile 
appears to be zero. It was also common for subjects with valuations in the 75th percentile to 
place bids near their valuation.
8
 Müller and Schotter (2010) invoke loss aversion to explain 
bifurcation. By contrast, Minor (2012) uses the concept of “coarse thinking,” a psychological 
phenomenon by which subjects collapse possible competitors into a single stereotype (i.e., strong 
and weak). 
In the papers mentioned above players are ex-ante symmetric, i.e., their values (or costs) 
are independently drawn from the same distribution. Wärneryd (2003) analyzes a two player 
lottery contest in which one contestant is informed of the common value of the prize prior to 
bidding, while the other player knows only the continuous distribution from which this value is 
drawn. Grosskopf et al. (2010) experimentally study asymmetric information contests 
reminiscent of Wärneryd (2003), and find that, in general, informed bidders tend to bid more 
aggressively than uninformed bidders. Interestingly, the average sum of bids in asymmetric 
information lottery contests and all-pay auctions are not statistically different, while they differ 
under symmetric information. The empirical result for asymmetric information contests does not 
conform to the theoretical prediction, which is that expected revenue in the all-pay auction is 
greater than expected revenue in the lottery contest. 
                                                 
8
 In two-player all-pay auctions, Dechenaux and Mancini (2008) find that low-valuation players behave more 
aggressively than in Noussair and Silver’s (2006) six-player auctions, suggesting that this finding does not prevail in 
smaller auctions. 
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In summary, the main lesson that we learn from experimental studies discussed in this 
section is that most studies find support for the comparative statics predictions of contest theory. 
Some commonly supported comparative statics results are the impact of incomplete information 
on individual behavior, the “discouragement effect”, and the impact of contest parameters (e.g., 
the number of players and the number of prizes) on effort. 
 
4. Dynamic Contests 
In this section we discuss contests with a dynamic structure. That is, contests in which 
some players can make decisions based on the actions of others. First, we discuss contests in 
which players move sequentially. Second, we discuss wars of attrition, which are multi-period 
contests of exit, which in some contexts can be interpreted as simultaneous move contests. Third, 
we examine a class of multi-stage contests with a finite horizon in which the set of players 
remains fixed. These include patent races and best-of-n contests. Fourth, we discuss multi-stage 
elimination contests, in which a certain number of players are eliminated at each stage of the 
competition. Finally, we conclude with a discussion of endogenous entry into contests. 
 
4.1. Sequential Contests 
In a sequential contest, the players choose effort sequentially, with players moving later 
in the game observing the previous players’ choices. Dixit (1987) derives theoretical predictions 
for two-player sequential contests under standard assumptions on the CSF which include the 
lottery CSF as a special case. If players are symmetric, then the simultaneous move Nash 
equilibrium effort levels constitute a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) outcome. By 
contrast, if the leader is a favorite, in the sense that his probability of winning the contest in the 
simultaneous move Nash equilibrium is greater than one half, then the leader’s SPNE effort level 
in the sequential contest is higher than under simultaneous moves. Leininger and Yang (1994) 
show that with the Tullock CSF with r > 2 and symmetric players, in the unique SPNE, the first-
mover preempts the second-mover by expending an effort level that forces the second-mover to 
expend zero. In a game such as Dixit’s (1987) in which the choice of timing is endogenized, 
Baik and Shogren (1992) show that in a SPNE, the favorite chooses to follow whereas the 
underdog chooses to lead. They use this result to argue that the favorite would not lead 
aggressively and, in fact, endogenous leadership by the underdog causes both players to expend 
less effort than under simultaneous moves. This theoretical prediction forms the basis for a 
number of related experiments. 
First, Shogren and Baik (1992) investigate the form of exogenous leadership that does not 
arise in their game of timing, the case of the “favorite leader” – “underdog follower” sequential 
contest. Assuming a lottery CSF, they compare behavior in this dynamic game to behavior in the 
simultaneous move contest. Their experiments identify several key behavioral departures from 
Dixit’s prediction. In the sequential contest, favorite first-movers submit effort levels that are no 
different from the favorites’ expenditures in the simultaneous move game. Overall, second-
movers best respond to the first-movers’ choices. Finally, the authors note that in their role as 
followers, underdogs sometimes seek to equalize the probability of winning across players rather 
than maximize their expected payoff.
9
 
                                                 
9
 Using a real-effort experiment, Gill and Prowse (2012) study a sequential-move tournament in which the second 
mover observes the first mover’s performance before choosing how much effort to expend. The results of the 
experiment provide evidence of a discouragement effect: second movers decrease their effort after observing a high 
effort by the first movers. 
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Weimann et al. (2000) also examine a sequential two-player contest, but employ a design 
with symmetric players and the Tullock CSF with r = 8. In equilibrium, the first-mover preempts 
the second-mover by submitting the lowest effort level for which the second-mover’s best 
response is to play zero. A striking finding is the lack of evidence for a first-mover advantage in 
the data. In many instances, second movers earn average payoffs above those earned by first-
movers. As Vogt et al. (2002) state when referring to Weimann et al.’s results, it appears as 
though second-movers “punished preemptive attempts and exploited cooperative attempts” (pg. 
74). 
Fonseca (2009) reconsiders experimental sequential contests under both symmetric and 
asymmetric conditions. More specifically, his experiment allows for a two-by-two comparison of 
contests by varying both the degree of symmetry between players (symmetric versus 
asymmetric) and the timing (simultaneous versus sequential). In the contest with symmetric 
players but asymmetric timing, first-movers submit effort levels in excess of the prediction. In 
contests with asymmetric players and timing, Fonseca’s findings replicate Shogren and Baik’s 
(1992) results to some extent. Favorite first-movers often fail to exploit their theoretically 
predicted first-mover advantage. Although a large proportion of preemptive attempts succeed, 
such aggressive (equilibrium) behavior by first-movers sometimes engenders retaliation by the 
second-mover. Indeed underdog second-movers often submit rather large effort levels, a 
behavior that can be rationalized by inequality aversion. 
Vogt et al. (2002) study contests in which players alternate in submitting bids and each 
player’s bids are summed across the duration of the contest to determine a player’s overall or 
total bid. At each point in time, previously submitted bids are public information and the window 
of opportunity during which contestants may submit bids closes after a randomly determined 
number of rounds. This design is broadly similar to that in Weimann et al. (2000) and is meant to 
experimentally implement Leininger and Yang’s (1994) infinite horizon alternating move model. 
In that model there exists a Markov perfect equilibrium in which tit-for-tat strategies are 
employed, generating a path of play on which bidding ends with the second mover (who bids 
zero). The experimental data exhibit patterns reminiscent of this equilibrium. Contestants stop 
accumulating effort relatively quickly (after 6 to 10 periods) so that bidding never escalates. As a 
result, average earnings are higher than in Weimann et al.’s simple leader-follower games. These 
findings suggest that alternating-move contests with an uncertain final period yield more 
efficient outcomes than one-shot leader-follower contests. 
The experiments discussed above involved either exogenously specified leader-follower 
roles or alternating moves. Baik et al. (1999) examine the natural extension of the leader-
follower setting to a game where the choice of timing is endogenous. In the first stage of the 
game, the players simultaneously choose either to commit to an effort level or to wait. If one 
player, the endogenous leader, immediately commits to an effort level and the other player, the 
endogenous follower, waits, then the follower learns the leader’s effort level and must choose his 
own effort level. If both players choose to wait, then they play a simultaneous contest. The 
results of the experiments indicate that subgame perfection predicts actual timing choices rather 
well. In particular, when subjects are given up to two days to think about their strategy, in a 
majority of cases, favorites endogenously choose to follow and underdogs choose to lead. 
 
4.2. Wars of Attrition 
Since the introduction of the “war of attrition” by Maynard Smith (1974), the model has 
been applied extensively in the field of biology. In the economics literature, the first 
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experimental study of the war of attrition is Bilodeau et al. (2004).
10
 They test a dynamic model 
of the volunteer’s dilemma in which the clock stops as soon as one participant volunteers.11 This 
model is similar to a discrete time war of attrition with complete information and a finite 
horizon. In five different treatments, the authors consider various parameters that influence the 
players’ benefit and cost of public good provision. Subgame perfection accurately predicts the 
identity of the volunteer only 41% of the time. One of the key departures from subgame 
perfection is that subjects rarely volunteer immediately. However, behavior responds to 
incentives in a sensible manner. For instance, other things equal, players with a greater benefit 
from volunteering do volunteer more often than other players. Similarly, other things equal, 
players with a lower cost of volunteering are more likely to stop the clock first. These qualitative 
predictions are consistent with a descriptive model in which contestants have “first-order beliefs” 
(see for instance, Nagel 1995). In this model, the contestants believe their opponents’ 
volunteering times are random draws from an identical distribution and they choose their 
volunteering time to maximize their expected payoff.
12
 
Hörisch and Kirchkamp’s (2010) experiment offers a direct comparison of the all-pay 
auction, the static representation of the war of attrition (i.e., the second-price all-pay auction) and 
the dynamic war of attrition (where an actual clock runs and the loser is the first player to stop 
it). In contrast to Bilodeau et al. (2004), Hörisch and Kirchkamp set up an environment with 
private costs drawn independently from an identical distribution. One of the main qualitative 
implications is that in the symmetric equilibrium of the war of attrition, almost all player types 
do not stop immediately. Moreover, the static and dynamic wars of attrition have the same 
symmetric equilibrium. In the laboratory, the authors find that overbidding prevails in the all-pay 
auction and the static war of attrition. However, subjects tend to undersupply effort in the 
dynamic war of attrition by stopping the clock earlier than predicted. For all treatments, the 
authors test for evidence of bifurcation in empirically estimated bidding functions, but even in 
the all-pay auction, they find no significant evidence of the commonly-observed behavioral 
pattern.  
Oprea et al. (2013) design an experiment based on the duopoly model of Fudenberg and 
Tirole (1986). In this model, two firms must decide whether or not to remain in a market or to 
exit. A player’s cost per unit of time of remaining in the market is private information and for a 
large range of these unit costs, duopoly profit is negative and monopoly profit is positive. For 
such values of unit costs, remaining in a duopoly market has an instantaneous cost equal to 
duopoly profit and a future benefit to a surviving firm equal to the monopoly profit. Oprea et 
al.’s design varies the dispersion in the distribution of costs to induce more or less uncertainty 
                                                 
10
 The first experimental study of a competitive environment resembling a war of attrition is Phillips and Mason 
(1997). However, in the dynamic Cournot game they analyze, players do not choose the time at which they wish to 
exit. Rather, a player remains in the game until he is forced to exit when his cumulative profit falls to zero. 
11
 The static volunteer’s dilemma is a simultaneous move game in which each of n players has two actions, 
“volunteer” and “not volunteer”. Any player who volunteers incurs a cost, c. If at least one player volunteers then all 
players receive an identical prize, v. If none of the players volunteer, then all players earn a payoff of zero. If v – c > 
0, the game has multiple Nash equilibria, including pure strategy equilibria in which one player volunteers and n – 1 
players do not volunteer, as well as a symmetric equilibrium in non-degenerate mixed strategies. Diekmann (1985, 
1986) experimentally studies symmetric games and the effect of the number of players on the probability of 
volunteering, and finds that a player’s likelihood of volunteering is decreasing in the number of players. Diekmann 
(1993) experimentally studies an asymmetric version of the game where players differ in their cost of volunteering, 
and finds that the players with the lowest cost of volunteering are more likely to volunteer. 
12
 The experiment by Otsubo and Rapoport (2008) also implements a finite horizon, complete information war of 
attrition (framed as a dynamic volunteer’s dilemma), but focuses on symmetric players.  
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regarding the rival’s cost. Observed behavior conforms rather well to the point prediction for exit 
times. As expected, there is a negative relationship between cost and exit time overall. 
Furthermore, when the degree of cost asymmetry between firms is high, high-cost firms tend to 
exit earlier than low-cost firms.  
DeScioli and Wilson (2011) observe behavior in an experiment that requires self-
selection into an asymmetric war of attrition. Unlike previous economic experiments, their 
experimental procedures are contextualized and meant to replicate the environment found in 
typical animal behavior experiments. Each subject controls an “avatar,” a virtual character that 
competes with other avatars over scarce resources located at various points of a virtual field. In 
one of the treatments, the resources are uniformly distributed across the field and in another 
treatment, they are clustered in patches. When encountering a rival avatar, a subject may “fight” 
(equivalent to a constant positive bid), “smile” (equivalent to a zero bid) or “travel” to another 
location. There are two types of players, large and small, and fights may arise between 
participants of equal size or between asymmetric participants. In the experiment the authors find 
that fights are much more frequent in the patchy than in the uniform treatment. Moreover, their 
experimental results indicate that an ownership convention develops in the patchy treatment 
because, in the resulting wars of attrition, residents are more likely to win than intruders, even 
after controlling for size.
13
 
 
4.3. Races 
The seminal work by Harris and Vickers (1985, 1987) on races provides a rich set of 
predictions in the theory of dynamic contests. In their models, two players each start at a finite 
distance from the finish line. In Harris and Vickers (1985), the two players take turns advancing 
a continuous distance, with a convex per unit cost of advancing within each period and progress 
that is deterministic. By contrast, in Harris and Vickers (1987), players engage in a sequence of 
component contests and each firm must win a certain (potentially different) number of contests 
in order to win the race. At the end of each component contest the contestants receive full 
feedback regarding the outcome of the stage game and their position in the race. Progress is 
stochastic, with the outcome of each contest determined by a type of modified Tullock lottery 
contest in which the cost of bidding is not only a function of the player’s own effort, but is 
decreasing in the other player’s effort.  
Zizzo’s (2002) experiment seeks to implement Harris and Vickers’s (1987) multi-stage 
race in the laboratory. Harris and Vickers provide a limited set of analytical results which can be 
used as point predictions, but provide several qualitative results. Zizzo (2002) derives several 
hypotheses based on their analysis. First, one implication of the Harris and Vickers analysis is 
that the leader (the player requiring the smaller number of consecutive component contest wins 
to win the contest) expends more than the follower in a given component contest. Second, the 
correlation between the gap (the difference between the number of consecutive wins needed to 
win the contest by the leader and by the follower) and component contest expenditure is more 
negative for the follower than for the leader. Third, as the gap increases, a threshold is reached 
beyond which the leader incurs almost all of the component contest expenditure. To test these 
hypotheses, Zizzo implements races with two subjects and a Tullock lottery CSF in each 
component contest. One of the key findings is that leaders do not invest significantly more than 
followers, unless the gap is extremely wide (that is, followers are five or more steps behind). 
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 In a recent paper, Caldara (2012) examines complete information common value pay-to-bid auctions, which 
resemble wars of attrition.   
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Therefore, the first hypothesis is rejected, while the data exhibit mitigated support for the third 
hypothesis. The data provide better support for the second hypothesis, suggesting that as the gap 
increases, discouragement affects the laggard’s behavior. 
The best-of-three contest examined by Mago et al. (2013) is similar to a race. Two 
players compete in a contest lasting at most three stages. The first player to win two stages 
obtains the final prize.
14
 As in Zizzo (2002), in Mago et al. (2013), two players engage in a 
simultaneous move Tullock component contest in each stage. There is perfect observability 
between stages. In Zizzo’s set-up, the winner is the first player to achieve ten successes, while in 
Mago et al., the winner is the first player to achieve two successes. Another key difference is that 
in Mago et al., a player obtains an intermediate prize for winning a stage, while there is no such 
prize in Zizzo. Moreover, Mago et al. vary r in the CSF in two separate treatments, r = 1 and r = 
0.4. Finally, Mago et al. consider a linear cost of effort, whereas in Zizzo the cost function is 
quadratic. In contrast to Zizzo, Mago et al. (2013) find that leaders expend more effort than 
followers. That is, stage 1 winners invest more than stage 1 losers, an effect they refer to as 
strategic momentum. They also find that including intermediate prizes increases both overall 
effort and the length of the race, results which both conform with the relevant theory. Finally, 
increasing the role of chance by lowering r decreases the likelihood of the race ending in two 
rounds.
15
 
Finally, Deck and Sheremeta (2012) employ a special case of a model of a race due to 
Konrad and Kovenock (2009) in which each component contest is an all-pay auction. Deck and 
Sheremeta interpret the model as a game in which an attacker of a resource and the resource’s 
owner engage in what is potentially a sequence of n > 1 component contests over the resource. 
The defender must win each of the contests to secure the resource and the attacker need only win 
one contest to capture the resource. For the pair of defender prize values chosen in their 
experiment, the defender’s optimal strategy is either to fight all battles by employing the same 
mixed strategy in every component contest or to give up and expend no effort. In the former 
case, the attacker responds by lowering his expected effort expenditure with each new battle. The 
qualitative findings of the experiment correspond to the theoretical predictions except for one 
key pattern. When fighting, rather than expending the same (respectively, lowering) expected 
effort in each new component contest, the defender (respectively, attacker) increases effort.  
 
4.4. Multi-Stage Contests with Carryover 
An important aspect of multi-stage contests is that effort may carry over from one stage 
to the next. In the models of races in Section 4.3, the effort expended in a given stage could not 
be used in subsequent stages.  
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 Irfanoglu et al. (2014) also investigate a best-of-three contest and compare its performance with a static contest. 
Mago and Sheremeta (2014) examine the best-of-three contest modeled as an all-pay auction. Their results are 
qualitatively similar to the findings of Mago et al. (2013). 
15
 The above studies provide evidence on behavior in races where opportunities for cooperation are nonexistent. 
Silipo (2005) sets up an experiment to examine the incentives for cooperation that may arise before the start of a 
patent race or emerge during its course. His model is based on Fudenberg et al. (1983) but allows for collusion. 
Silipo employs a three-by-two design that varies the degree of asymmetry in starting positions and the value of the 
prize. He observes rather high rates of cooperation, but mostly when the players are symmetric. With asymmetries, 
in the sense that one of the subjects has a head start in the race, cooperation does not emerge as often. Furthermore, 
when the prize value is low, any cooperation typically breaks down as contestants approach the finish line. Like the 
Harris and Vickers models, Fudenberg et al.’s (1983) model exhibits the property that once a player has established 
a sufficient lead, this player makes all the investment while the laggard gives up. For duopolies that do not 
cooperate, Silipo does find evidence that points to such a discouragement effect. 
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A number of recent studies have used the Tullock CSF to examine contests with 
carryover.
16
 In Schmitt et al. (2004) the same bidders interact in a sequence of contests. A 
participant’s bids accumulate over time but they depreciate at a constant, non-negative 
depreciation rate. Schmitt et al. (2004) consider three values for the carryover rate and they also 
vary feedback conditions. The main finding is that, contrary to equilibrium, carryover reduces 
overall expenditure. Furthermore, carryover induces contestants to expend more effort in the first 
than in the second stage. Interestingly, in a two-stage elimination contest and a related design, 
Sheremeta (2010a) also finds that the effect of carryover is to increase first-stage effort levels 
and decrease second-stage effort. However, contrary to Schmitt et al. (2004), the total effort 
increases in the carryover rate. Hence, the efficiency effect of allowing effort carryover can be 
either positive or negative depending on whether the multi-stage contest has an elimination 
structure.
17
 
Ryvkin (2011) investigates another aspect of effort carryover, namely fatigue. Players 
engage in a best-of-n overall contest and may choose one of two effort levels in each contest, 
high and low. Players who choose the high effort in a component contest decrease their 
probability of winning in later component contests. The model is constructed so that in the 
absence of fatigue choosing high effort in all stages is a dominant strategy. When fatigue is 
possible, high effort in all stages of the contest is no longer an equilibrium. In the experiment, 
Ryvkin tests the major predictions of the model and finds that subjects strategically respond to 
changes in the parameters of the contest in a manner predicted by equilibrium behavior. 
 
4.5. Multi-Stage Elimination Contests 
Many contests in practice consist of multiple players and multiple stages. In each stage 
contestants exert efforts in order to advance to the final stage and win a prize. At the end of each 
stage, a specific number of contestants are eliminated from participation. Such contests are 
prevalent in real life; however, empirical studies of multi-stage elimination contests are hard to 
conduct due to endogeneity and selection problems (Szymanski, 2003). For this reason, many 
multi-stage elimination contests have been studied in a laboratory setting. 
Parco et al. (2005) and Amaldoss and Rapoport (2009) investigate a symmetric two-stage 
elimination lottery contest, where each player has a budget constraint that constrains his total 
expenditure of effort across the two stages. In the first stage, players compete by expending 
effort within their own groups, and the winner of each group proceeds to the second stage. In the 
second stage, players compete with one another to win a prize by expending additional effort 
subject to their overall budget constraint. Parco et al. (2005) study this model with a two-group 
two-player experimental design, and find significantly higher effort than predicted in the first 
stage and, as a consequence, significantly lower effort in the second stage. They conjecture that a 
non-monetary value of winning and misperception of the probabilities of winning play a crucial 
role in explaining these findings. Amaldoss and Rapoport (2009) further test this conjecture in a 
similar symmetric two-stage elimination contest with larger group sizes: a three-group eight-
player and an eight-group three-player contest. As before, they find first-stage effort levels that 
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 An early study of a contest in which effort from previous stages is carried over to later periods is Sbriglia and 
Hey’s (1994) real-task experiment. 
17
 In multi-stage contests, with or without carryover, the discount rate that players apply to future payoffs affects the 
intertemporal allocation of effort. Deck and Jahedi’s (2014) experiment seeks to test whether individual contestants 
discount future gains and whether they strategically anticipate that others also discount future payoffs. 
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are significantly higher than predicted. The results also suggest that the utility of winning, rather 
than misperception of the probabilities of winning, plays a crucial role in explaining the data.
18
 
Sheremeta (2010a, 2010b) investigates two-stage elimination contests with a lottery CSF 
and constant unit cost of effort (without budget constraints). Sheremeta (2010b) also compares 
the performance of a two-stage contest to a revenue equivalent one-stage contest. Contrary to the 
theoretical predictions of Gradstein and Konrad (1999), the two-stage contest generates higher 
aggregate effort than the corresponding one-stage contest, and efforts are higher than predicted 
by the SPNE in both stages of the two-stage contest. Additionally, Sheremeta shows that a 
simple behavioral model featuring a non-monetary utility of winning explains both efforts higher 
than the theoretical benchmark and the difference between the efforts expended in the one-stage 
and two-stage contests. 
Höchtl et al. (2014) study a two-stage lottery contest similar to Sheremeta (2010a, 
2010b). The main difference, however, is that instead of being homogeneous, players are one of 
two types: strong or weak (low or high marginal cost). Höchtl et al. show both theoretically and 
experimentally that total effort is maximized if strong players compete against each other in the 
first stage of the contest. On the other hand, a strong player is more likely to win the elimination 
contest if strong players compete against weak players in the first stage of the contest. 
Amegashie et al. (2007) study a two-stage elimination all-pay auction with heterogeneous 
players and budget constraints. In the experiment there are four players, each with a different 
valuation for the prize. In the first stage, all players place their bids and the two highest bids 
proceed to the second stage. The two winners of the first stage place their bids in the second 
stage, subject to the remaining budget constraint. Amegashie et al. find that subjects behave 
according to the SPNE, which involves “burning out” by using all of the available budget in the 
first stage. They also find that subjects exert significantly higher bids when groups are larger, 
thus concluding that more competition leads to higher bids, and that burning out is a competitive 
phenomenon. 
Finally, Altmann et al. (2012) conduct an experimental investigation of a two-stage 
elimination rank-order tournament and compare its performance to a revenue equivalent one-
stage tournament. Consistent with previous findings on rank-order tournaments (Bull et al., 
1987), average effort in a one-stage tournament is close to the Nash equilibrium. In contrast, 
subjects in the two-stage tournament exert a higher effort in the first stage than in both the SPNE 
benchmark and the equivalent one-stage tournament. This finding is robust to a pointwise 
increase in the marginal cost of effort obtained by making the cost function more convex. 
Combined with the findings of Sheremeta (2010b), the fact that the over-expenditure of effort is 
significantly higher in the two-stage contest than in the one-stage contest suggests that there is a 
fundamental difference between subjects’ behavior in two-stage and one-stage elimination 
contests. Whether this pattern is due to a non-monetary utility of winning, sunk cost fallacy, 
misperception of the probabilities, or yet another behavioral anomaly remains an open question. 
 
4.6. Endogenous Entry 
There is a growing interest in endogenous participation in contests. One of the first 
experimental studies to address this issue is Fullerton et al. (1999), who base their experimental 
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 Chark et al. (2011) study two-stage elimination lottery contests with large group sizes, no binding constraints, and 
groups that are of unequal sizes. Qualitatively, their results are similar to Parco et al. (2005) and Amaldoss and 
Rapoport (2009), although Chark et al. find little evidence for over-expenditure in the first stage. 
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design on Taylor’s (1995) innovation tournament model.19 Fullerton et al. (1999) find substantial 
support for the model’s comparative statics predictions, indicating that subjects optimally choose 
to participate in research contests by employing effort expenditures that are influenced by the 
number of contestants, the value of the prize and the cost of effort.  
Anderson and Stafford (2003) build their experimental design on the theoretical model of 
Gradstein (1995), which extends Tullock’s (1980) model by introducing an entrance fee and 
asymmetric cost structure. They find that, consistent with theoretical predictions, low ability 
(high cost) contestants frequently choose not to participate in the lottery contest and instead opt 
out for a fixed payment. In a related study, Morgan et al. (2012) design an experiment using the 
Tullock lottery contest where subjects may choose whether to participate in a contest or obtain a 
fixed payment as an outside option. Morgan et al. examine cases with both relatively large and 
small contest prizes. They find that, consistent with theory, contest entry and effort expenditures 
increase with the size of the prize. However, they also find that when the prize is small, there is 
more participation than predicted (over-entry) and contest participants earn less than the outside 
option. On the other hand, when the prize is large, there is under-entry and contest participants 
earn more than predicted. 
Eriksson et al. (2009b) conduct an experiment where subjects can choose to enter the 
Lazear-Rosen rank-order tournament or be paid according to a payoff equivalent piece-rate 
incentive scheme. They find that subjects choose tournaments about 50% of the time. Using Holt 
and Laury’s (2002) elicitation procedure for risk preferences, Eriksson et al. show that the more 
risk-averse subjects are, the less likely they are to enter tournaments. Dohmen and Falk (2011) 
use a similar approach by letting subjects self-select into one of the four payment schemes, 
including a fixed payment, piece-rate, tournament and a revenue-sharing scheme. The results of 
the experiment demonstrate that subjects systematically sort into different payment schemes. 
When the choice is between a fixed payment and a tournament, subjects are more likely to enter 
the tournament if they are less risk-averse, more productive and more optimistic.  
Bartling et al. (2009) use a real-effort experiment to study how subjects’ distributional 
preferences influence their decisions to enter a tournament or a piece-rate incentive scheme. 
They find that inequality-averse subjects are less likely to enter the tournament. Similarly, 
Balafoutas et al. (2012) document that, controlling for beliefs, inequality-averse and spiteful 
subjects are less likely to enter tournaments. Finally, Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) document 
that men enter tournaments significantly more often than women. In summary, all of these 
findings highlight the importance of endogenous sorting when players are allowed to choose 
other opportunities and the tendency for rank-order tournaments to systematically attract people 
with specific individual characteristics, including people that are less risk or inequality averse.  
Several studies examine entry decisions into alternative contest structures. Vandegrift et 
al. (2007), for example, report a real-effort experiment in which subjects choose between a 
piece-rate, a single-prize and multiple-prize lottery contests. They find that, holding total 
payments constant across contests, effort is higher in the single-prize contest than in a multi-
prize contest. However, entry rates into the single-prize contest are lower than into the multi-
prize contest. Consequently, Vandegrift et al. conclude that the single-prize contest is more 
efficient in generating higher effort but less efficient in inducing entry and identifying the most 
capable players from the given pool of participants. 
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 Baye and Hoppe (2003) show that the innovation tournament is strategically equivalent to a Tullock contest with 
an endogenous prize. 
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Another experimental study that compares entry into alternative contest structures is 
Cason et al. (2010). Cason et al. employ a real-effort experiment in which subjects can choose 
between a piece-rate, a single-prize and proportional-prize contest, each with the same total prize 
value. They find that a proportional-prize contest attracts more entrants and generates more 
aggregate effort than a single-prize contest. The proportional-prize contest performs better by 
encouraging entry and a performance of low ability players, without discouraging entry or the 
performance of high ability players. 
 
5. Static Multi-Battle Contests 
In a wide range of disciplines, including computer science, political science, economics, 
management science, and the military sciences, there are environments that may be characterized 
as games of multiple contests with linkages (Kovenock and Roberson, 2012). These games have 
long attracted the attention of theorists and, more recently, have been the subject of experimental 
investigation. 
 
5.1. Constant-Sum Colonel Blotto Games 
The Colonel Blotto game has its roots in a paper by Borel (1921) in which two players 
must simultaneously select an ordered triple of three nonnegative numbers which sum to a 
common constant and the winning player is the player who chooses the higher number in two of 
the three components of the triple. According to McDonald and Tukey (1949), Colonel Blotto 
games were examined in the process of solving practical military problems by Charles P. Winsor 
and Tukey at Princeton during World War II. Since then, substantial theoretical work on these 
games was undertaken in the context of military operations research, computer science, political 
science, management science, and economics (for a review see Kovenock and Roberson, 2012). 
These theoretical contributions have spurred a host of experimental tests of Colonel Blotto 
models.
20
 
Avrahami and Kareev (2009) study a discrete constant-sum Colonel Blotto game as in 
Hart (2008) in which players maximize the expected number of battlefields won subject to a 
budget constraint. They look at both symmetric and asymmetric budgets. The results of the 
experiment support the qualitative predictions of the theory. Specifically, as predicted, the 
weaker players (with lower budgets) allocate zero resources to a subset of battlefields. The 
number of battlefields to which the weaker players allocate zero resources increases in the 
relative strength of their opponents. 
Chowdhury et al. (2013a) provide an experimental test of the theoretical predictions of 
the Colonel Blotto game with a continuous strategy space in which players maximize the 
expected number of battlefields won subject to asymmetric budgets. The experiment has separate 
treatments with an auction CSF and a lottery CSF based on the theoretical treatments of 
Roberson (2006) and Friedman (1958), respectively. Due to the constant-sum nature of the game, 
the experiment also compares a fixed matching protocol (where subjects are paired for all 15 
rounds) and a random matching protocol (where subjects are randomly re-matched after each 
round). The results of the experiment provide support for the main qualitative predictions of the 
theory. In the auction treatments, the weaker players often use a “guerilla warfare” strategy 
which stochastically allocates zero resources to a subset of battlefields. The stronger players 
often employ a “stochastic complete coverage” strategy, allocating random, but positive, 
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 Recently, the Colonel Blotto game became available on Facebook, known as Project Waterloo (Kohli et al., 
2012). 
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resource levels to each battlefield. However, subjects also exhibit significant serial correlation 
across periods in allocations to a given battlefield, which is not predicted by the theory. This 
correlation is reduced under the fixed matching protocol, but it is not entirely eliminated. Under 
the lottery treatments there is support for the equilibrium prediction of a constant allocation 
across all battlefields for both players. 
Cinar and Goksel (2012) compare Colonel Blotto games with symmetric resources and 
asymmetric resources. They also vary the number of battlefields. An interesting feature of their 
design is that in each treatment, subjects play for 12 periods against a computer which is 
programmed to play an optimal strategy derived from the theory. The results of the experiment 
indicate that in all treatments the aggregate behavior of all subjects is well predicted by the 
theory. As in Chowdhury et al. (2013a), subjects’ payoffs are relatively close to the theoretical 
benchmarks. Nevertheless, in the asymmetric case, computer generated strategies outperform 
strategies chosen by subjects and thus, in this case, subjects usually receive lower payoffs than 
predicted by the theory. 
Finally, Arad (2012) examines a Colonel Blotto game between symmetric players, in 
which resources cannot be allocated continuously, but instead, are clustered into several 
partitions, which represent different levels of force. The player who allocates a greater level of 
force to a battlefield wins that battle. Arad motivates this game as a “tennis coach problem,” 
where a coach has to allocate four tennis players of different skills (resources of different values) 
among four positions (battlefields). The objective is to win a majority of the battlefields. The 
results of the experiment show that most subjects use only a small number of strategies, 
disregarding a large set of potential strategies. The behavior of some subjects can be explained 
by an adapted level-k model of iterating reasoning (Stahl and Wilson, 1994). 
 
5.2. Non-Constant-Sum Blotto-like Games 
The classical formulation of the Colonel Blotto game is as a constant-sum game. Players 
are budget constrained and resources allocated have zero opportunity cost; that is, resources are 
“use it or lose it.” However, there are a number of related formulations in which the game is non- 
constant-sum. One example is the case in which unused resources have positive value (Szentes 
and Rosenthal, 2003; Klumpp and Polborn, 2006; Kvasov, 2007, Roberson and Kvasov, 2012). 
Mago and Sheremeta (2014) investigate the non-constant-sum multi-battle contest that is 
the all-pay auction special case of the chopstick-auction examined by Szentes and Rosenthal 
(2003). In their contest two players simultaneously expend effort in three battles. The player 
expending the highest effort in a battle wins that battle with certainty (i.e., the auction CSF) and 
the player who wins the majority of the battles (two or more) wins the contest. Players pay an 
identical constant unit cost of effort in each battle. Consistent with other experimental findings 
on single-battle contests, Mago and Sheremeta (2014) find significant over-expenditure of 
resources relative to the Nash equilibrium benchmark. Consistent with the theory, subjects make 
positive but random allocations in each battle and allocations fall within the theoretically 
predicted univariate supports. Contrary to the theory, subjects often make positive allocations in 
only two out of three battles (instead of all three) and they significantly overuse moderately high 
allocations. 
Irfanoglu et al. (2014) also investigate a three-battle contest similar to Mago and 
Sheremeta (2014). However, the main difference is that the probability of winning the battle is 
determined by the lottery CSF. Nash equilibrium requires that subjects allocate an equal 
expenditure across the three battles (Klumpp and Polborn, 2006). However, contrary to this 
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prediction, none of the subjects employ a uniform expenditure strategy. Most subjects vary their 
expenditure between battles in a given period and within battles over time, although such 
dispersion of expenditure decreases as the game is repeated (with random matching). 
Arad and Rubinstein (2012) examine a version of the Colonel Blotto game between 
symmetric players using a combination of a large scale web-based experiment and classroom 
experiments. In their experiment, players are symmetric. Players choose their strategies once and 
these strategies are played in a tournament against the strategies of all other players in the 
session, and the player with the most battlefields won wins the overall game. Within each 
battlefield an auction CSF is used, but in the case of a tie neither of the players is awarded the 
battlefield. Thus, the standard constant-sum Colonel Blotto game is transformed into a non-
constant-sum game due purely to possible ties. Arad and Rubinstein provide a theoretical 
prediction for subjects’ behavior based on multi-dimensional iterative reasoning, and discuss in 
details the type of strategies that are most successful in achieving the highest payoff in the 
Colonel Blotto game. These strategies generally involve the almost complete neglect of two 
battlefields, often the endpoint (first and last) battlefields, with moderately high allocations to 
four battlefields. 
 
5.3. Asymmetric Objectives 
Often players may have asymmetric objectives when participating in multi-battle 
contests. For example, in patent races firms often must obtain a cluster of patents in order to 
produce a commercially viable product. In military battles, the attacker’s objective is often to 
successfully attack only one target, or a subset of targets, and the defender’s objective is to 
successfully defend all targets. 
Kovenock et al. (2010) experimentally investigate a two-player multi-battle contest in 
which players have asymmetric objectives. In this game a risk-neutral attacker and defender 
simultaneously allocate a scarce resource obtained at constant unit cost across the set of 
battlefields. The battlefields form a weakest-link network for the defender. The attacker receives 
a prize if he wins at least one battle. The defender receives a prize if he wins all battles. For each 
player, the probability of winning any given battle is determined either by the auction CSF 
(Kovenock and Roberson, 2010) or the lottery CSF (Clark and Konrad, 2007). For both CSF’s, 
the Nash equilibrium depends on the ratio of the defender’s valuation of the prize to the 
attacker’s valuation. There is a key distinction between equilibria under the auction CSF and the 
lottery CSF. With the auction CSF, the attacker employs a “guerilla warfare” strategy by exerting 
effort in attacking at most one randomly chosen target. On the other hand, the defender either 
exerts random amounts of effort defending all targets or gives up on all of them. In contrast, with 
the lottery CSF, the attacker exerts the same level of effort at every target. Although the 
theoretical predictions associated with the auction CSF are, on the whole, supported by the data, 
the last prediction of the lottery CSF is not borne out by the data. The experimental evidence 
shows that not only do attackers employ stochastic guerilla warfare strategies in most of the 
games with the auction CSF, but surprisingly, they also do so in about half of the games with the 
lottery CSF. 
Montero et al. (2014) investigate both discrete and continuous constant-sum Colonel 
Blotto games where battlefields have asymmetric values and values are the same for both 
players. The authors systematically vary the number of battlefields, with one battlefield having 
higher value than the others, and the resource budgets. The objective is majoritarian, i.e., the 
player who accumulates the highest sum of battlefield values wins the game. The results of the 
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experiment indicate that subjects often use strategies that allocate resources to a subset of 
battlefields that is the minimum necessary for winning. Moreover, within this subset, resources 
are allocated proportionally to the value of the battlefield, contrary to the theoretical prediction 
of Young (1978) that the more important battlefield should receive a disproportionally higher 
allocation than the less important battlefields. 
Finally, Horta-Vallve and Llorente-Saguer (2010) examine a discrete Colonel Blotto 
game with incomplete information concerning the players’ values of the individual battlefields. 
Players have identical budgets which they simultaneously allocate across the set of battlefields 
and each player’s vector of battlefield values is independently drawn from a discrete distribution 
over positive vectors whose components sum to a fixed constant. The objective of each player is 
to maximize the expected sum of battlefield values won. The authors systematically vary the 
number of battlefields. The results of the experiment indicate that subjects do not play truthful 
strategies, i.e., strategies that reveal subjects’ preferences for winning specific battlefields. 
Nevertheless, in the aggregate subjects attain more than 80% of the efficient level of welfare, i.e., 
the sum of the players’ payoffs is maximized. 
 
6. Extensions 
6.1. Sabotage in Contests 
Sabotage occurs whenever a contestant invests in reducing the effectiveness of a rival’s 
effort. Other things constant, sabotage increases the saboteur’s probability of winning. Such 
destructive activities typically require using scarce resources so that, in general, sabotage is a 
costly and welfare-reducing endeavor. As noted by Carpenter et al. (2010), despite the 
importance of sabotage to the efficiency properties of tournaments, relatively little experimental 
work has been devoted to it. Harbring and Irlenbusch and their co-authors (2005, 2007, 2008, 
2011) have provided a large share of the findings in this area. Several studies show that sabotage 
activities increase as the spread between winner and loser prizes widens (Harbring and 
Irlenbusch, 2005; Falk et al., 2008; Harbring and Irlenbusch, 2011). These studies focus on the 
role of the contest designer (the principal) in mitigating the incidence of sabotage through the 
judicious choice of incentive contracts. A contest designer who seeks to maximize total effort 
should optimally reduce the spread between winner and loser prizes, as compared to the optimal 
spread when sabotage is not possible. 
Gürtler et al. (2013) show theoretically that sabotage is not only counterproductive but it 
also imposes an indirect cost of weakening incentives. They examine a two-stage game with a 
simultaneous binary choice of effort in the first stage followed by a simultaneous binary choice 
of sabotage activities, contingent on the profile of efforts, in the second stage. In the equilibrium, 
leaders (those exerting high effort in the first stage) are sabotaged more than followers (those 
exerting low effort) and thus there is less incentive to exert the high effort required to be a leader. 
Gürtler et al. demonstrate that this problem can be solved by concealing intermediate information 
on the players’ performances. These theoretical predictions are supported by complementary 
experimental studies. 
Carpenter et al. (2010) add context and a real-effort task to the experimental study of 
sabotage. In their experiment, participants engage in a clerical task whose output is measured 
along two dimensions: quantity and quality. Participants privately evaluate each other’s 
performance along these two dimensions. Underreporting both of quantity and quality, i.e., 
sabotage, is thus feasible at no monetary cost. The authors examine two compensation schemes, 
piece-rate and tournament, expecting that sabotage would occur only under the tournament 
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scheme. The results are clear-cut: objectively measured output is highest under tournament 
incentives when sabotage is not feasible and lowest in the tournament with sabotage. The 
possibility of sabotage does not affect output under piece-rate incentives. 
 
6.2. Feedback in Contests 
There has been relatively little theoretical work on the impact of feedback on individual 
performance in contests (for exceptions, see Kräkel, 2008; Ederer, 2010). Nevertheless, there are 
many studies in the lab and in the field investigating how feedback impacts behavior in contests. 
The findings on feedback are mixed, with different studies often providing contrasting results. 
Eriksson et al. (2009a) experimentally investigate the impact of feedback on individual 
performance under piece-rate incentive schemes and in real-effort rank-order tournaments. The 
three feedback conditions are: no feedback about relative performance, discrete feedback given 
halfway through the production period, and continuous feedback. The results of the experiment 
indicate that neither discrete nor continuous feedback has any effect on effort under a piece-rate 
scheme. In contrast, in the rank-order tournament there are some positive peer effects of 
feedback, with players who lag behind never quitting and players who are ahead not slacking 
during the contest. Similarly, Fershtman and Gneezy (2011) study how feedback impacts quitting 
behavior in tournaments by conducting a field experiment with high school students running 
athletics races. In the two treatments of interest, students either run side by side (feedback) or 
separately (no feedback). In contrast to Eriksson et al. (2009a), Fershtman and Gneezy (2011) 
find that students often quit the tournament with continuous feedback, while there is significantly 
less quitting with no feedback. 
Kuhnen and Tymula (2012) design a real-effort tournament experiment in which subjects 
work on multiplication problems during a 90-second round. Kuhnen and Tymula find that 
subjects work harder and expect to rank better when they are told they will learn their ranking, 
relative to cases where they are told feedback will not be provided. After receiving feedback, 
subjects who ranked better than expected decrease their performance, but expect an even better 
rank in the future rounds. Subjects who ranked worse than expected increase their performance 
and lower their future rank expectations. Similarly, Ludwig and Lünser (2012) find that in a 
chosen-effort two-stage rank-order tournament, contestants who lag behind tend to increase 
effort in the second stage, while those who lead tend to reduce effort. Nevertheless, the authors 
find no significant difference in total effort between the feedback and the no feedback 
treatments. Hence, although providing feedback changes the timing of effort expenditure, it does 
not alter the overall performance of the tournament. In a chosen-effort lottery contest, Mago et 
al. (2014) also find that ex-post feedback about relative performance does not affect aggregate 
effort in contests, but it significantly affects the dynamics of individual behavior similar to the 
real-effort experiments of Ludwig and Lünser (2012) and Kuhnen and Tymula (2012).
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Given that feedback can sometimes have a significant effect on effort, the principal may 
have an incentive to misreport intermediate information to the contestants (Ederer, 2010). Ederer 
and Fehr (2009) design a two-stage rank-order tournament between two agents in which total 
output across stages is used to determine the winner. In one of the treatments, the agents are not 
told their first-stage output levels, while the principal learns that information. Before the second 
stage begins, the principal may report effort levels to each of the agents. In the treatment of 
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 An exception is Fallucchi et al. (2013) who investigate the role of information feedback in a chosen-effort lottery 
contest and find that additional feedback about rivals’ efforts reduces aggregate effort. One notable difference is that 
Fallucchi et al.’s experiment lasts for 60 periods, while Mago et al.’s experiment lasts only for 20 periods. 
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interest, the principal’s message is cheap talk and thus, should be ignored in a perfect Bayesian 
equilibrium. In equilibrium, even a message known to be truthful should not affect second-stage 
effort levels. Equipped with these predictions the authors find that subjects expend similar effort 
when the principal provides either no feedback or feedback that is known to be truthful. 
Furthermore, these effort levels are not significantly different from the equilibrium prediction. In 
contrast, when the principal’s feedback is cheap-talk, effort is lower than in the other two 
treatments. Gürtler and Harbring (2010) also analyze a principal’s optimal feedback policy in 
tournaments. They show that in equilibrium the principal reveals intermediate information 
regarding the agents’ previous performances if these performances are relatively similar, and 
agents react to the principal’s feedback decision. The experimental findings provide some 
support for the theoretical predictions of the model. Agents exert lower efforts when principals 
reveal intermediate information about relatively uneven performance. Principals correctly 
anticipate this behavior and, as a consequence, they are less likely to reveal information about 
agents’ intermediate performance if this performance is relatively uneven. 
 
6.3. Bias in Contests and Affirmative Action 
In Section 3.2 we noted that greater heterogeneity between players may lead to lower 
aggregate effort in contests because of the “discouragement effect”: the ability and willingness of 
a stronger player to bid aggressively to win the contest discourages a weaker player from bidding 
aggressively for fear of losing his bid. As a consequence, the weaker player reduces his effort. A 
contest designer wishing to maximize aggregate effort may take this effect into account and bias 
the contest against one or more of the candidates. This bias may be implemented either through 
discounting or “handicapping” the effort of stronger players or through augmenting the efforts of 
weaker players.  
The primary application of the study of bias in contests is to the examination of 
affirmative action policies in hiring or education. Although there are many motivations for 
inducing bias in contests, our focus here is that bias may in fact induce greater aggregate effort in 
equilibrium.
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One of the first laboratory studies on affirmative action is Schotter and Weigelt (1992). 
Without affirmative action, Schotter and Weigelt find that disadvantaged players usually drop 
out of rank-order tournaments. However, this discouragement effect decreases when affirmative 
action, designed as a head-start advantage for the disadvantaged player, is implemented. As a 
result, the aggregate performance in the tournament increases, although the magnitude of this 
effect depends on the degree of heterogeneity and the level of affirmative action. 
Michelitch (2009) points out a potential disadvantage of affirmative action policies such 
as quotas, i.e., dividing the set of all contestants into subsets that compete for separate sets of 
prizes. A common criticism is that quota-eligible individuals exert less effort in a tournament, 
while quota-ineligible individuals exert more effort. In a tournament experiment, Michelitch 
(2009) finds that quota-eligible individuals indeed exert less effort than quota-ineligible 
individuals. Balafoutas and Sutter (2012) and Niederle et al. (2013) examine how affirmative 
action affects competitive entry and performance in tournaments by men and women. Niederle et 
al. (2013) find that, although affirmative action (towards women) encourages entry by women 
into tournaments, it may come at the cost of discouraging entry by men. Balafoutas and Sutter 
(2012) find that affirmative action leads to significantly higher entry by women; however, it does 
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group members even when all contestants are symmetric and exert the same efforts. 
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not discourage entry by men. Moreover, affirmative action leads to higher aggregate 
performance in tournaments. 
Finally, Calsamiglia et al. (2013) use a field experiment to study affirmative action 
policies among children. As in the two studies mentioned above, they find that an affirmative 
action policy significantly increases the chance of disadvantaged players winning the 
tournament, without discouraging the performance of other players. We discuss the study of 
Calsamiglia et al. (2013) in more detail in Section 7. 
 
6.4. Collusion and Communication 
In the three contest formats discussed in this paper, players could increase their total 
expected payoffs by jointly lowering their individual efforts below the Nash equilibrium level. 
Clearly, the total expected payoffs are maximized when all contestants expend zero effort (with a 
suitable tie-break). Therefore, there is a strong incentive for collusion among participants. 
Although collusion does not seem relevant in some of the applications of contest theory (e.g., 
political competition), in other cases, it is a real possibility (e.g., military conflict, labor 
tournaments, R&D competition). 
The study of collusion in experimental contests is even more important given that 
subjects tend to overbid. Imperfectly collusive behavior may in fact bring effort levels closer to 
the static non-cooperative equilibrium levels. For the all-pay auction, Lugovskyy et al. (2010) 
find that this is indeed the case in comparing behavior under random matching to behavior under 
fixed matching. Although the number of periods is known, thereby making the game a finitely 
repeated game, bids are lower with fixed matching than with random matching. In a multiple-
prize discrete all-pay auction, Harbring and Irlenbusch (2003) vary the number of contestants 
from two to six and employ fixed matching. They find that effort levels are lower in two-player 
than in six-player contests because a greater fraction of players bid zero. Such seemingly 
collusive behavior is significantly less frequent with a greater number of contestants.
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Even with repeated interactions, collusion may be difficult to sustain if it remains tacit. 
Therefore, it is crucial to analyze the impact of communication on effort levels. Harbring (2006) 
compares the total effort in a standard two-player rank-order tournament setting with a winner 
and a loser prize to a non-competitive team compensation scheme where total output is shared 
equally between the two players. The design varies the compensation scheme, whether or not 
communication is possible between contestants and the type of communication. In one of the 
communication treatments, the contestants are restricted to messages about their intended 
actions. In another communication treatment, the contestants may use a chat program. All 
sessions use a fixed matching protocol. Harbring finds that although restricted communication 
only has a weakly collusive effect on effort, chat communication increases effort under the team 
compensation scheme and dramatically lowers effort under tournament incentives. Both findings 
suggest a strong effect of communication on cooperative play. 
Sutter and Strassmair (2009) and Cason et al. (2012) compare the effect of 
communication between groups of players to communication within a group of players. 
Communication is implemented using a chat application. Both studies find that simple within-
group communication leads to higher effort, but not necessarily to higher earnings (Cason et al., 
2012, 2014).
24
 On the other hand, extending communication opportunities to allow both for 
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 In a related experiment with sabotage, Harbring and Irlenbusch (2008) fail to replicate the finding that two-player 
contests are prone to collusive behavior. 
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 In a related study, Leibbrandt and Saaksvuori (2012) document similar results in contests between groups. 
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within and between-group communication helps collusion by lowering effort levels and thus 
raising average earnings. 
 
6.5 Group Contests and Alliances 
Many contests are characterized by competition between groups (or “teams” or 
“alliances”) and not individuals. Examples include competition between corporate consortia, 
R&D competition between firms, election campaigns by political parties and alliances between 
countries engaged in warfare. The formation and performance of alliances in conflicts is a topic 
as old as the study of conflict and much of the recent modeling in this area has employed contest 
theory (for a survey, see Bloch 2012). The renewed theoretical interest in alliances has seen a 
parallel interest in experiments on group and alliance behavior. 
In group contests, members of the same group have an incentive to cooperate with each 
other by contributing individual efforts in order to win the contest. Since effort is costly, each 
member also has an incentive to shirk in contributing effort and free-ride on the efforts of other 
members. Theoretically, the amount of free-riding that occurs within a group depends on the 
composition of the group, the technologies of group performance, and the rules that regulate the 
competition (Baik, 1993; Lee, 2012; Chowdhury et al., 2013b). 
Much of the experimental literature on group contests is recent and employs the lottery 
CSF. Some of the studies focus primarily on the performance of groups assuming that the prize 
is shared equally among group members (e.g., Abbink et al., 2010; Sheremeta and Zhang, 2010; 
Cason et al., 2012, 2014). A distinct set of experiments examine the role played by the sharing 
rule within the winning group (e.g. Ke, 2011; Ke et al., 2013, 2014). The sharing rules that are 
compared are equal sharing, sharing proportional to individual effort and nested contests, 
whereby the members of the victorious alliance engage in a within-group contest. 
Abbink et al. (2010, 2012) and Ahn et al. (2011) study lottery contests between 
symmetric groups as in Katz et al. (1990), where each winning group member receives the full 
prize. They investigate treatments in which individuals compete, respectively, against individuals 
and against groups. All three studies document very high rates of overbidding, with the highest 
bids reaching up to five times the Nash equilibrium level. This overbidding is observed in all 
treatments, regardless of whether individuals compete against individuals, groups compete 
against groups, or individuals compete against groups. Abbink et al. (2010) further document 
that when group members are allowed to punish free-riders, the overbidding is even higher (up to 
nine times higher than the Nash equilibrium). Such high rates of overbidding are troubling and 
are hard to reconcile with standard economic theory. Abbink et al. (2012) suggest that such 
behavior in intra-group contests can be explained by parochial altruism – altruism towards group 
members along with hostility towards non-members. 
Cherry and Cotten (2011) extend the theoretical analysis of Katz et al. (1990) by 
introducing the possibility that the two competing groups may be interdependent (i.e., 
individuals can be part of both sides of a contest). Theoretical and experimental results indicate 
that strategic individual behavior, and the resulting rent dissipation, is affected by the relative 
size of the groups. Specifically, Cherry and Cotten (2011) find that individual efforts by group 
members decrease and individual efforts of those outside the group increase in the relative size 
of the group. These results are consistent with one of the Nash equilibria of the group contest 
with interdependent groups. 
Sheremeta and Zhang (2010) study lottery contests between teams, each comprised of 
two players who must decide upon a single team effort, and compare team effort to the effort in a 
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properly normalized contest between two (single) players. The team members can communicate 
before the contest. Although single players and teams over-expend effort compared to the 
predicted levels, teams perform better by exerting efforts that are closer to Nash equilibrium. 
One interpretation of this finding is that alliances can make better decisions than individuals. 
Deck et al. (2012) examine alliances in a model in which an attacker selects among two targets 
after observing the level of defense at each. The attacker attacks the weakest target, meaning that 
if each target is defended separately, one defender’s expenditure imposes a negative externality 
on the other. Deck et al. examine experimentally whether this externality provides an incentive 
for the defenders to form an alliance and the alliance’s impact on equilibrium expenditures. One 
implication of the model is that if the defenders form an alliance then their expected payoffs 
increase despite the fact that a successful attack is more likely given the overall reduction in 
defense. Experimentally, alliances yield higher payoffs to defenders as predicted, but also reduce 
the likelihood of a successful attack, counter to the theoretical prediction. 
So far, all of the contests between groups discussed share the feature that all players 
within the winning group split the prize equally. Such an egalitarian sharing rule creates 
incentives for some group members to free-ride on the effort of others. One possible solution is a 
proportional sharing rule, where players of the winning group split the prize in proportion to the 
efforts that they contributed to the group performance. Gunnthorsdottir and Rapoport (2006) and 
Kugler et al. (2010) find that the proportional sharing rule elicits higher individual efforts than 
the egalitarian rule.  
The experimental literature on alliances in conflicts further emphasizes the role played by 
the sharing rule within the alliance. Ke et al. (2013) consider a setting in which an alliance of two 
players fights a single opponent in a lottery contest, with the sharing rule as the key treatment 
variable. In one treatment, the members of a victorious alliance share the prize equally. In the 
other treatment, they engage in a within-alliance lottery contest in order to determine which 
alliance member earns the prize. In the latter case, the contest is a two-stage game. Ke et al. 
emphasize their comparison of within-alliance contests to contests between two strangers. 
Theory predicts that there should be no difference in behavior when the contest is between 
fellow group members as compared to a contest between strangers. The data provide evidence 
for this prediction. However, there is no evidence in favor of the hypothesis that an exogenously 
given equal sharing rule results in higher alliance effort than the contest sharing rule. In a related 
study, Ke et al. (2014) find that alliances are more likely to break down if the sharing rule is not 
the equal sharing rule. Finally, Ke (2011) finds that when allies share the prize proportionally (as 
in the deterministic proportional-prize contest), instead of probabilistically (as in the lottery 
contest), efforts are significantly lower by both allies and stand-alone opponents, resulting in 
higher payoffs to all competing parties. Therefore, alliance formation can be beneficial to both 
allies and stand-alone players. 
Behavior in group contests with an auction CSF has been examined experimentally by 
Amaldoss et al. (2000), although they specify that no player wins a prize in the event of a tie. 
They consider contests played by teams of two players. Each alliance’s pure strategy space has 
three possible effort levels, including zero. In one of the treatments, the alliance’s effort is the 
maximum of its members’ efforts (best-shot), whereas in other treatments the alliance’s effort is 
the sum of the efforts of its members (perfect substitutes). The authors consider two sharing rules 
for the victorious alliance: equal sharing and sharing that is proportional to effort (as in the 
deterministic proportional-prize contest). Finally, the authors vary the size of the prize across 
treatments. For both types of alliances (best-shot and perfect substitutes), regardless of the 
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sharing rule, the mixed strategy equilibrium explains aggregate frequencies of play reasonably 
well for high and medium prizes. However, when the prize value is low, subjects tend to overbid 
relative to the Nash equilibrium. The sharing rule has no significant effect on effort. The key 
finding is that best-shot contests generate significantly less effort than alliances in which 
effective effort is the sum of the members’ expenditure. This behavior is consistent with the 
equilibrium prediction. 
The experimental analysis of rank-order tournaments between groups began almost two 
decades ago with Nalbantian and Schotter (1997). In their experiment, there are two identical 
groups, consisting of six players each, and the performance of the group is the sum of all the 
individual group members’ efforts. The best performing group receives the prize and all players 
of the winning group split the prize equally. Nalbantian and Schotter (1997) find that, compared 
to other incentive schemes (i.e., profit sharing, revenue sharing, or gain sharing), a contest 
between groups increases effort and mitigates the within-group free-rider problem. Similar 
qualitative results are obtained in an information gathering experiment by Vasilaky (2011) and a 
real-effort experiment by van Dijk et al. (2001). Follow-up studies by Sutter and Strassmair 
(2009), Cason et al. (2012, 2014), and Leibbrandt and Saaksvuori (2012) show that the 
introduction of within-group communication can further reduce the free-riding incentives within 
a group. However, as pointed out by Cason et al. (2012), enhanced within-group coordination 
may lead to extensive and inefficient competition between groups. 
We end this section with a brief discussion of natural extensions to heterogeneous players 
and endogenous alliance formation. Most studies on contests between groups assume identical 
players within each group. One notable exception is Sheremeta (2011b), who investigates lottery 
contests between groups, where each group has one strong player, with a higher valuation for the 
prize, and two weak players, with lower valuations. The experiment examines three contests: a 
perfect-substitutes contest in which all efforts are perfect substitutes (Baik, 1993), a best-shot 
contest in which group performance depends on the best performer (Chowdhury et al., 2013b), 
and a weakest-link contest in which group performance depends on the worst performer (Lee, 
2012). Sheremeta finds that in perfect-substitutes contests all players expend significantly higher 
efforts than predicted by theory. In best-shot contests, most of the effort is expended by strong 
players while weak players free-ride. Finally, in weakest-link contests, there is almost no free-
riding and all players expend similar positive efforts. 
 The endogenous formation of alliances is examined by Herbst et al. (2014). Their 
experiment implements three-player lottery contests with random matching. In a two-by-two 
design they vary whether alliance formation is exogenous or endogenous, as well as the cost of 
forming an alliance (in one of the treatments, this cost is negative so that alliance formation is 
subsidized). Herbst et al. find that contestants who expend relatively lower effort levels in 
contests where no alliance is formed display a greater willingness to form alliances. Despite this 
observed self-selection of less aggressive subjects into alliances, endogenous alliances tend to 
generate higher effort than exogenously formed alliances. 
 
6.6. Behavior and Gender 
A number of contributions to the literature examine whether men and women behave 
differently in contests and tournaments. Gneezy et al. (2003) point out that the answer to this 
question is of great economic importance because tournaments are ubiquitous within firms, 
especially among top management. Furthermore, gender differences in many aspects of human 
activity have been a subject of study across a wide array of disciplines, ranging from biology to 
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psychology (Gneezy and Rustichini, 2004). Economists have much to contribute to this large 
body of literature, in particular through the use of experimental methods. 
Several experimental studies do indeed find robust evidence that men and women behave 
differently in tournaments (Croson and Gneezy, 2009; Niederle and Vesterlund, 2011). In fact, 
this evidence is corroborated both by laboratory and field experiments. Generally speaking, 
women are less likely to enter tournaments than men are (women “shy away from competition”). 
Second, women do not perform as well as men under tournament incentives. Third, possible 
differences in attitudes toward risk can only partially explain these differences. An extensive 
survey of gender differences is already available (Niederle and Vesterlund, 2011) and is beyond 
the scope of this paper. Therefore, we simply highlight a handful of major contributions and 
some of their extensions.  
When studying gender related questions, laboratory experiments that use a real-effort task 
such as adding sequences of numbers or maze solving are common. Gneezy et al. (2003) have 
groups of men and women engage in a maze solving task. They find that women perform as well 
as men under a piece-rate scheme, but they solve significantly fewer mazes under tournament 
incentives. They are able to rule out differences in risk aversion as the factor causing the 
discrepancy and, instead, they argue that differing attitudes toward competition play a major role. 
Gneezy and Rustichini (2004) use a field setting wherein pairs of schoolboys and 
schoolgirls compete in a footrace, first in a non-competitive and then in a competitive 
environment. When competing, children of equal ability are matched in pairs. In this pure field 
experiment, there are no monetary incentives. The general finding is that, when compared to a 
non-competitive setting, under competition boys improve in their performance relative to girls. 
In fact, as in Gneezy et al. (2003), when a girl is matched with a boy, a girl’s performance tends 
to be lower in the competitive race than when there is no competition. 
Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) design an experiment that focuses on selection into 
tournaments. The subjects engage in a number adding task under both piece-rate and tournament 
incentives. While the performances of men and women are not statistically different under either 
the piece-rate or tournament schemes, when asked which payment scheme they would like to 
participate in, men choose the tournament much more often than women. The authors attribute 
this result to gender differences in confidence and attitudes toward competition. We note that 
their study spearheaded a host of papers on the topic, most of which replicate their result (e.g., 
Cason et al., 2010; Niederle and Vesterlund, 2011; Balafoutas and Sutter, 2012). Notably, in a 
setting similar to Niederle and Vesterlund (2007), Healy and Pate (2010) find that competition in 
teams helps close the gender gap in entry by two thirds. 
Interestingly, several studies (Mago et al., 2013; Brookins and Ryvkin, 2014; Price and 
Sheremeta, 2014) find that women bid significantly more than men in lottery contests.
25
 As a 
result of significantly higher bids, women receive significantly lower earnings from the contest 
than men. The fact that women earn significantly lower payoffs in contests may suggest that the 
ex-ante decision to “shy away from competition” may be rational.  
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 Similarly, Ong and Chen (2012) find that women bid significantly more than men in all-pay auctions with 
complete information. Moreover, controlling for the gender of the bidder and the opponent, Ong and Chen argue 
that observed behavior is consistent with equilibrium behavior where women attach a higher valuation to winning 
the all-pay auction than men. 
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7. Field Experiments 
Field experiments differ from their laboratory counterparts in many respects (Harrison 
and List, 2004). Not only do field experiments use real-effort tasks, but these tasks are performed 
in their natural environment by professionals (experts).  
Erev et al.’s (1993) orange grove experiment is arguably the first experiment to test 
contest theory in the field. The focus of the study is on the incentives to free-ride in teams of fruit 
pickers. The authors view effort contribution to the team as a voluntary contribution mechanism 
(VCM). Hence, if each team member is paid an equal share of the team’s output, free-riding is an 
equilibrium strategy. In one of the treatments, the teams of four workers are split into pairs that 
compete against each other for a reward. The within-team contest should provide an incentive for 
each pair to contribute effort and thus avoid free-riding. Erev et al. find that tournament 
incentives lead to significantly higher output (a 35% gain). Furthermore, output tends to increase 
over time in the contest treatment, while it tends to fall in the VCM condition, so tournament 
incentives help teams overcome the free-riding problem. Blimpo (2014) and Bigoni et al. (2011) 
replicate this result in the setting of secondary schools in Benin and the University of Bologna in 
Italy, suggesting that tournaments can be effective mechanisms in increasing team performance 
and school achievement. 
Leuven et al. (2011), conduct a field experiment using students at the University of 
Amsterdam in the Netherlands. Students could self-select into tournaments with one of three 
types of prizes: low (€1000), medium (€3000) and high (€5000). In the data, performance 
increases with the size of the prize, but the authors show that this positive effect of tournament 
incentives is due to sorting. Controlling for sorting and heterogeneity of students, there is no 
significant effect of tournament incentives on the aggregate performance of students. Similarly, 
very little in the way of incentive effects are documented by Leuven et al. (2010). One possible 
reason for the insignificant findings in both of these studies is that the ratio of the number of 
prizes to the number of students is very low (i.e., less than 1 to 25). De Paola et al. (2012) 
conduct a field experiment, involving undergraduates at a university in southern Italy, where the 
number of prizes to the number of students is relatively high (i.e., around 1 to 5). Students are 
randomly assigned to one of the three treatments: a control group, a small prize (€250) and a 
large prize (€700). They find that, as predicted by theory, more valuable prizes significantly 
increase student performance both in terms of the number of credits earned and the grades 
obtained on exams. High ability students, who are very likely to win the tournament, increase 
their performance the most, while low ability students do not change their performance. 
Hossain et al. (2014) conduct a field experiment at a large-sized Chinese manufacturing 
company. During the eight-week long experiment, workers on the team with the higher per-hour 
productivity were provided a weekly prize (bonus). The prize was framed either positively as a 
reward or negatively as a punishment (although both framings are theoretically equivalent). 
Prizes increased the average weekly productivity by 14%, indicating a strong incentive effect of 
tournaments. Moreover, the team for which prize was framed as a punishment was at least 35% 
more likely to produce at a rate higher than the team for which prize was framed as a reward. 
Delfgaauw et al. (2013) find that tournament incentives have a significant effect on sales 
performance. They implement a sales competition between grocery stores belonging to the same 
retail chain. The rank-order tournament between stores is based on sales growth as the 
performance measure. There are two treatments, one in which two winner prizes are awarded to 
the two top performers and one in which there is no prize. In the latter treatment, stores simply 
provide feedback on relative performance. In the data, sales growth is higher in both treatments 
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than in the baseline without relative performance information. Surprisingly, simple feedback is 
as effective in increasing sales growth as the monetary reward. 
Fershtman and Gneezy (2011) also highlight the importance of feedback in tournaments. 
They design a field experiment involving schoolchildren who participate in a 60-meter footrace. 
The design varies matching (assortative by skill versus random), the power of tournament 
incentives (none, low, high) and the information condition (contestants either run side by side or 
on separate tracks). The main finding is that the likelihood a contestant will give up during the 
race is highest in the high reward treatment. Hence, high-reward tournaments seem to induce 
more “quitting in the middle,” particularly when contestants run side by side. By contrast, such 
quitting behavior barely occurs under low or no reward. Another finding is that tournaments with 
no reward draw little participation. That is, a significantly larger number of students opt out of 
the tournament race when no reward is offered than in the other treatments. Finally, the authors 
conclude that the overall winner of the race performs better in the high reward treatment than 
with either no or a small reward. 
Field experiments have also been used to study different predictions from contest theory. 
Calsamiglia et al. (2013), for example, design pair-wise tournaments among children from two 
schools in Spain. Students in one school (experienced) are taught how to solve simple numerical 
puzzles or “sudokus” as part of their regular mathematics courses, while students in the other 
school (inexperienced) are not. In the experiment, students from the two schools competed in 
pair-wise tournaments for 30 minutes by solving sudokus. The findings confirm that the 
asymmetry in experience is reflected in subjects’ performance, with experienced subjects solving 
significantly more than inexperienced subjects. A policy which marginally biases tournament 
rules in favor of inexperienced students reduces performance of experienced subjects, while 
significantly increasing the chances of inexperienced subjects to win the tournament. 
List et al. (2014) conduct both a laboratory and a field experiment to study how the 
number of contestants impacts individual efforts in tournaments. The field experiment uses non-
professional fishermen as subjects. One of the notable characteristics of the experimental setting 
is that it allows the authors to measure inputs, while most field studies on tournaments only 
measure output (they demonstrate empirically that the input measure has a large and significant 
effect on fish caught). The design varies the number of contestants between two and eight within 
session. The authors argue that because the stock of fish in the pond decreases with each catch, 
the density of the noise is decreasing. In this case, effort is predicted to decrease with the number 
of contestants (see a more detailed discussion in Section 3.1). Experimental data provide strong 
support for this prediction. Casas-Arce and Martinez-Jerez (2009) analyze the sales contests 
organized by a commodities firm and, similarly to List et al., find that individual efforts decrease 
in the number of contestants. 
Another design issue in tournaments is the number of prizes (see Sections 3.3 and 3.4). 
Lim et al. (2009) conduct a field experiment among salespeople which is also accompanied by a 
chosen-effort experiment (for details see Section 8). In the experiment, salespeople were asked to 
either sell sponsorships to the business community through a golf tournament or to solicit 
donations from companies to raise funds for the university. Salespeople were assigned either to a 
15-salespeople contest with one prize of $300 or to a 15-salespeople contest with five prizes of 
$60. Consistent with the theoretical predictions of Kalra and Shi (2001), the authors find that the 
five-prize contest elicits higher performance (average sales) than the equivalent single-prize 
contest. 
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Many tournaments in the field have a dynamic structure (see Section 4). Liu et al. (2014) 
design a field experiment to study the performance of sequential and simultaneous all-pay 
auctions with incomplete information. The experiment is conducted on a crowdsourcing website 
Taskcn.com, one of the largest Q&A sites in China. Consistent with theoretical predictions, tasks 
with high prizes attract more submissions and higher quality answers than tasks with low prizes. 
Also, as expected, in the sequential case early entry of a high quality answer deters the entry of 
users. Delfgaauw et al. (2014) conduct a field experiment in a retail chain to test basic 
predictions regarding the prize spread and noise in two-stage elimination tournaments. 
Tournaments differ in the distribution of prize money across the respective winners of the first 
and second stages of the tournament, while keeping total prize money constant. The modified 
model of Lazear and Rosen (1981) predicts that a more convex prize structure leads to better 
second-stage performance at the expense of first-stage performance. It also predicts that noise 
weakens incentives to perform, as it reduces the marginal effect of effort on the probability of 
winning. The findings indicate that, as predicted by theory, a more convex prize spread increases 
performance in the second stage at the expense of first-stage performance. Noise also has a 
negative effect on the response to tournament incentives. 
There are several field experiments that compare tournaments with alternative payment 
schemes. Bandiera et al. (2005) exploit an exogenous change in the compensation scheme of 
workers at a large farm to compare piece-rate and relative performance pay. Under the relative 
performance pay, workers are paid according to how their productivity compares to average 
productivity in the field; thus, a worker’s expected payoff is similar to the expected payoff in a 
lottery contest. The main finding of interest is that for the average worker, productivity increases 
by at least 50% when moving from tournament-type incentives to a piece-rate scheme. The 
authors conclude that workers behave as if they have social preferences and are thus reluctant to 
impose negative externalities on other workers by exerting higher effort in tournaments. In the 
follow up study, Bandiera et al. (2006) find substantial evidence of collusive behavior in 
tournaments, which can further explain why piece-rates may sometimes outperform tournaments. 
In the same line of research, Bandiera et al. (2013) design a field experiment to evaluate the 
effects of piece-rate, tournament and rank incentives (i.e., simply displaying the rank of each 
team’s productivity) on the productivity and composition of teams. They find that the 
introduction of tournament and rank incentives leads to significant changes in team composition, 
making workers more likely to form teams with others of similar ability instead of with their 
friends. Introducing rank incentives reduces average productivity by 14%, whereas introducing a 
tournament increases it by 24%. However, the effects are heterogeneous: rank incentives only 
reduce the productivity of low ability teams, and tournaments only increase the productivity of 
high ability teams. Finally, teams that remain intact after the introduction of incentives do not 
change their productivity under rank incentives but increase their productivity by 25% under 
tournament incentives. In summary, these findings suggest that tournaments affect firm 
performance through both the endogenous changes in team composition and changes in behavior 
within the same team. 
Finally, several studies show how tournaments with no monetary prizes can be used as 
incentive mechanisms in the field (Kosfeld and Neckermann, 2011; Barankay, 2011).
26
 Kosfeld 
and Neckermann (2011), for example, design an experiment to study how symbolic awards 
impact individual behavior in the field. In the experiment, students enter data for three weeks as 
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 For a laboratory experiment on tournaments used as an intrinsic motivation for giving see Duffy and Kornienko 
(2010). Also, see Sheremeta (2010a, 2010b). 
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part of a non-governmental organization project. The treatment is to honor the best performance 
publically with a symbolic award. Kosfeld and Neckermann find that the award treatment raises 
performance by 12%. Barankay (2011) designs a field experiment on a crowdsourcing website to 
see how feedback about ranking (in terms of performance compared to others) affects the 
behavior of employees. Although rank has no real implication for compensation, compared to a 
control group with no rank feedback, employees who receive feedback about their rank are 30% 
less likely to return to work and also 22% less productive on the job. Although the studies of 
Kosfeld and Neckermann (2011) and Barankay (2011) are not directly comparable, the striking 
difference between their findings further highlights the importance of conducting field 
experiments. 
 
8. Applications 
Contest theory may be used to examine a wide range of topics, from sports competitions 
and the competition for admission to college, to political campaigns, innovation races, and 
military conflict. Arguably one of the most direct applications of contest theory is to political 
competition and lobbying. Tullock’s (1980) seminal work that introduced the canonical Tullock 
contest is an analysis of rent-seeking behavior. Moreover, in the United States in particular, 
elections resemble contests in which candidates spend effort and money on advertising in order 
to increase their chance of winning. Hence contest theory naturally applies to electoral 
competition. Beginning with Millner and Pratt (1989) and Davis and Reilly (1998), a number of 
experimental studies have examined behavior in political contests. For example, Öncüler and 
Croson (2005) study a political contest in which the value of the prize is uncertain at the time 
candidates commit to campaign expenditure. Bullock and Rutström’s (2007) experiment also 
considers an environment where lobbyists compete for a prize of endogenous value. Kräkel et al. 
(2012) examine behavior in a two-player electoral contest, where candidates first decide on their 
political program (high or low risk) and then spend money (exert effort) conveying these 
programs. Other experiments on political competition include Sheremeta (2010a), who studies an 
elimination political contest with effort carryover, and Irfanoglu et al. (2014), who analyze a 
best-of-three contest designed to gain insight into the so-called New Hampshire effect (Klumpp 
and Polborn, 2006). These studies are discussed in more detail in Section 4.4 and Sections 5.2. 
Theoretical models of contests have also been used to analyze expenditure on legal 
services in litigation. In this context, the players are litigants and their bids represent 
expenditures on legal services. The contest success function is interpreted as a production 
function of legal outcomes. Several experimental studies have applied contest models to legal 
battles in order to compare the effect of different fee allocation rules on legal expenditure. 
Coughlan and Plott’s (1997) experiment compares the American rule to the British rule of 
allocating expenditure. As predicted, conditional on the occurrence of a trial, the British rule 
generates substantially greater total expenditure than the American rule. Dechenaux and Mancini 
(2008) obtain similar findings by employing the generalized contest payoff function in (5) and 
the auction CSF. Finally, Deck and Farmer (2009) also study the behavior of litigants with 
respect to expenditure on legal services, but their focus is on final-offer arbitration. 
Many contest models have been employed to analyze strategic behavior in wars. 
Arguably, one of the first war applications of contest theory is the Colonel Blotto game 
introduced by Borel (1921). The two most relevant studies that investigate the behavior of 
attackers and defenders in war games are Kovenock et al. (2010) and Deck and Sheremeta 
(2012). Both studies examine behavior in (simultaneous and sequential, respectively) attacker-
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defender games, where the defender needs to win all targets, while the attacker needs to win only 
one target to secure the prize. Other experiments on war contests are done by Linster et al. 
(2001), who examine the incentive to invest in military deterrence faced by two members of a 
coalition fighting a common opponent, Lacomba et al. (2014), who examine behavior in different 
post-conflict scenarios, Durham et al. (1998), who study the “Paradox of Power”, and Holt et al. 
(2014), who study the “Paradox of Misaligned Profiling.” 
Given the high costs of conflict documented by experimental studies, a natural question 
that arises is how one could avoid a potential conflict. Since the seminal book by Schelling 
(1960), a number of mechanisms for avoiding conflicts have been proposed, ranging from 
deterrence via extensive armament to contractually binding side-payments. Recently, several 
laboratory experiments have examined different conflict resolution mechanisms including side-
payments (Kimbrough and Sheremeta, 2013, 2014) and random devices (Kimbrough et al., 2013, 
2014). Other studies investigate the importance of retaliation (Lacomba et al., 2014), emotions 
(Bolle et al., 2014), and the length of the conflict (McBride and Skaperdas, 2014), on the 
likelihood of conflict avoidance. 
It is important to emphasize that contests are not always destructive. For example, 
contests are commonly used to motivate sales. According to Lim et al. (2009), sales contests are 
“short-term incentives that managers use to raise sales effort.” Lim et al. (2009) design both a lab 
and a field experiment to examine the optimal prize structure for generating the highest sales 
effort. A follow up study by Lim (2010) addresses the role of social preferences in influencing 
behavior in rank-order sales tournaments. Finally, Chen et al. (2011) study the role of 
asymmetries in sales contests. 
Finally, contests are often used as fundraising mechanisms. There has been a recent surge 
in both laboratory and field experiments on fundraising contests. A number of lab experiments 
compare lotteries and all-pay auctions to the system of voluntary contributions (Morgan and 
Sefton, 2000; Lange et al., 2007; Orzen, 2008; Corazzini et al., 2010), and different types of 
winner-pay auctions (Davis et al., 2006; Schram and Onderstal, 2009).
27
 There are also some 
studies that take experimental charity contests to the field: Landry et al. (2006), Carpenter et al. 
(2008), and Onderstal et al. (2011). The findings from these experiments point that, under certain 
conditions, lotteries and all-pay auctions may outperform other types of fundraising mechanisms. 
 
9. Conclusions and Future Directions 
There are several important lessons that emerge from the papers that we surveyed. First, 
most laboratory studies on lottery contests and all-pay auctions find significant overbidding 
relative to the Nash equilibrium prediction. Second, in contrast to lottery contests and all-pay 
auctions, there is very little overbidding in rank-order tournaments and aggregate effort usually 
conforms to the theoretical predictions. Third, in all three canonical contests there is significant 
heterogeneity in the behavior of individual subjects. Fourth, in lottery contests and rank-order 
tournaments bids are usually distributed around the equilibrium, while in all-pay auctions the 
distribution of bids is bimodal, with some subjects submitting very low and others submitting 
very high bids. Finally, most of the experimental studies, both in the laboratory and in the field, 
find support for the comparative statics predictions of contest theory. Some commonly supported 
comparative statics results are the impact of incomplete information on individual behavior, the 
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 Dickinson and Isaac (1998) and Dickinson (2001) were the first to show the effectiveness of an all-pay auction as 
an incentive mechanism in raising contributions to public goods. Although, these studies do not explicitly use the 
term “all-pay auction,” the incentives are such that the highest contributor to the VCM receives a prize.  
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“discouragement effect”, and the impact of contest parameters (e.g., the number of players and 
the number of prizes) on effort. 
We see a number of fruitful avenues for future experimental research on contests. First, 
the sources of overbidding in lottery contests and all-pay auctions is still an open question. 
Although there are numerous factors that may contribute to overbidding, as discussed by 
Sheremeta (2013, 2015), it remains an open question as to whether some of these factors are 
related to each other and which are the most important. For example, is it possible that the non-
monetary utility of winning is driven by status-seeking preferences, or vice versa? Similarly, 
judgmental biases may be correlated with mistakes and loss-aversion. It would also be interesting 
to examine whether the patterns of overbidding in lottery contests and all-pay auctions are 
caused by the same underlying attributes. For example, do the same subjects who overbid in 
lottery contests also overbid in all-pay auctions? If subjects make mistakes in lottery contests 
then does it imply that they are also more likely to make mistakes in all-pay auctions? The 
answers to these questions would significantly advance our understanding of overbidding 
phenomenon. 
Second, it is intriguing that there is almost no overbidding in rank-order tournaments. 
Our main conjecture is that this striking difference when compared to lottery contests and all-pay 
auctions can be explained by the fact that in rank-order tournaments, the cost of effort is 
generally taken to be strictly convex (which is needed to guarantee that a pure strategy Nash 
equilibrium exists), contrary to the linear cost function employed in experiments on lottery 
contests and all-pay auctions. In fact, two studies suggest that this could be indeed the case. 
Chowdhury et al. (2014) find that overbidding in lottery contests significantly decreases when 
the cost of effort is convex instead of linear. Similarly, Müller and Schotter (2010) find that 
overbidding in all-pay auctions vanishes when the cost function is strictly convex instead of 
linear. Therefore, we conjecture that there is no overbidding in rank-order tournaments because 
in all experiments the cost of effort is convex. However, more research is needed to confirm this 
conjecture.
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Third, given the prevalence of overbidding in lottery contests and all-pay auctions and its 
absence in rank-order tournaments, it is important to know whether overbidding occurs in field 
settings with real-effort and high stakes. Do field experiments offer insights on whether 
overbidding is a robust phenomenon? If so, then are the explanations for overbidding in the field 
similar to the explanations for overbidding in the laboratory? Although these questions are very 
important, we see a number of difficulties in attempting to answer them. To examine whether 
overbidding is observed in the field, one needs to precisely measure individual effort. However, 
in the field, only the performance of contestants, which is a function of effort, ability and luck 
(Ericsson and Charness, 1994) is observed. Therefore, to answer the aforementioned questions, 
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 Another explanation for the lack of overbidding in rank-order tournaments is the high dispersion of the 
performance noise 𝜀𝑖. The substantial amount of noise in the CSF may lead subjects to restrain effort, thereby 
decreasing overbidding. In fact, Nieken (2010) finds that when given the choice between two distributions of 
performance noise, subjects are reluctant to choose the distribution with the higher variance even when a risk neutral 
player would find it beneficial to do so. This finding confirms our conjecture that aversion to random shocks in the 
CSF could help explain the absence of overbidding in rank-order tournaments. Finally, the lack of overbidding in 
rank-order tournaments can be driven by the fact that the marginal benefit of effort around 0 is very low. In a lottery 
contest or an all-pay auction it is virtually impossible to win with the effort of 0, but in a rank-order tournament it is 
possible. Whether it is the convexity of costs, the presence of noise in the CSF, or the low marginal benefit of effort 
that mitigates overbidding in rank-order tournaments is an interesting question for future research. 
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one would need to design an experiment which clearly measures individual ability, luck and 
effort. 
Finally, we have only hinted at the importance of developing and investigating 
mechanisms aimed at avoiding potential conflicts. Although there is substantial theoretical work, 
originating with Schelling (1960), which addresses conflict resolution mechanisms, there are 
only a few experimental studies that test such mechanisms. We expect future experimental 
research to focus on issues such as de-escalation, deterrence, as well as the management and 
resolution of conflicts. 
There are undoubtedly many other important applications of contest theory that have 
escaped our overview and will capture the interest of experimenters in the future. We very much 
look forward to revisiting the area in five years to see where the growth of the field, so evident in 
Figure 1, takes us.  
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Figures 
 
Figure 1: Time Trend of Papers Published in Academic Journals. 
  
 
Figure 2: Distribution of Efforts in a Lottery Contest. 
 
Note: The data are taken from Sheremeta (2011a). 
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Figure 3: Non-Monetary Utility from Winning.
 
Note: The data are taken from Sheremeta (2010b). 
 
Figure 4: Distribution of Efforts in an All-Pay Auction. 
 
Note: The data are taken from Gneezy and Smorodinsky (2006). 
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Figure 5: Dynamics of Average Effort in a Rank-Order Tournament. 
 
Note: The data are taken from Orrison et al. (2004). 
 
Figure 6: Bifurcation in the All-Pay Auction with Incomplete Information. 
  
Note: The data are taken from Noussair and Silver (2006). 
 
 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Effort 
Period 
2 Players
4 Players
6 Players
Nash Equilibrium
0
200
400
600
800
1000
0 200 400 600 800 1000
Bid 
Value Actual Nash Equilibrium
